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BASIS VARIABILITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON HEDGING EFFICIENCY FOR 
KENTUCKY FEEDER CATTLE 
 
 
 
Kentucky plays a vital role in the beef supply chain. The cow/calf producers, 
back-grounding operations, and order buying industry are important parts of Kentucky’s 
agricultural economy. Basis risk is an issue that affects these groups in a negative way. A 
good estimate of the expected basis must be available to make hedging efficient. 
Simulations were performed on Kentucky price data to determine the effectiveness of 
short hedging for Kentucky producers. A model was also used to describe some of the 
factors that determine basis levels. The research revealed that it is difficult to predict 
basis within an acceptable range to make short hedging with futures efficient. Even 
though short hedging reduced variability in net price, it was difficult to lock in a profit. 
Various options and spread strategies were presented as alternative hedging tools that 
would protect cattle producers from unexpected price declines. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, AND OBJECTIV ES 
Kentucky plays a vital role in the beef supply chain. The 2005 calf crop was 
approximately 1.11 million head which ranks Kentucky approximately 11th nationally in 
the number of calves born (NASS). There are over 40,000 cattle producers in the state 
(NASS). Kentucky cattle production is characterized by a large number of cow-calf 
operations and a smaller number of larger size backgrounding operations. Cow-calf 
producers maintain a cow herd and produce a calf crop once each year. Backgrounding 
operations purchase calves from cow-calf producers and feed them forage and rations to 
grow them up to the 600-800 pound range that is suitable for feedlots. Some calf 
producers retain their calves to be weaned and back grounded to feeder cattle size on 
farm while other producers sell their calves to backgrounders at weaning. Calf production 
and feeder cattle backgrounding have proven to be succe sful businesses for many 
farmers in Kentucky.  
The prices received by farmers for their feeder cattle vary each year due to many 
supply and demand factors. This variability in price leads to variability in income for 
each individual. Prices occasionally dip below breakeven levels causing producers to lose 
money. This variability and risk of loss makes it more difficult to make future production 
decisions. Since it is inefficient and costly for producers to make large swings in herd 
size from year to year, producers need an accurate forecast of future prices in order to 
make efficient production decisions. It is essential th t the producer understand the 
relationship between cash and futures prices to be able to form such a forecast and 
possibly benefit from using futures hedging strategies. 
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 With a large number of smaller producers in Kentucky the cattle marketing link 
in the beef supply chain is of large importance. Cattle marketing companies, also known 
as order buyers or cattle dealers provide cash market liquidity by purchasing cattle from 
auction markets and private sales with producers. In the case of feeder cattle, order 
buyers assemble load lots of cattle for sale and shipment to the major cattle feeding areas 
in the Midwest. These companies and their feedlot cus omers stay in close contact with 
each other and feedlots will generally give orders to individuals at the company to buy a 
certain number of loads of feeder cattle each week or month. This is where the name 
order buyer originated. Order buying companies make money by charging a commission 
to the feedlot on loads of cattle they purchase for cur ent delivery. Some buyers keep an 
inventory of cattle purchased for future delivery and try to profit by forward selling the 
cattle at profitable levels to feedlots or attempt to lock in profits with feeder cattle futures. 
Order buyers and dealers must have a good understanding of the relationship between 
futures and cash markets in order to find profitable trading opportunities.    
Basis and its Importance 
Cash and futures markets are linked by the basis, or spread between them.  Basis 
is defined as: Cash price minus Futures price. Basis simply reflects specific local supply 
and demand conditions whereas futures prices reflect overall supply and demand for a 
commodity. Basis typically changes over the course of a year. This is described as the 
time dimension of basis. An example of basis changing over time would be an increase in 
stocker cattle prices in the spring relative to the feeder futures price due to greater 
demand for stocker cattle by backgrounders. The demand is greater in early spring 
because that is when pastures start growing enough t  support cattle. Buyers compete for 
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the stocker cattle to take advantage of the new season grass. On the other hand cash 
prices typically fall relative to feeder futures prices in the fall because that is when the 
largest supply of calves comes to market. Basis is typically different across markets in 
different areas of the country. This is known as the space dimension of basis. Basis is 
different across locations for a variety of reasons. Regional supply and demand 
conditions such as differences in quality of cattle, proximity of the market to feedlots and 
back-grounders, the size of the market, and weather events are some factors that make the 
basis different across locations. The following table shows the average basis levels for 
selected states around the country. Basis levels tend to follow a seasonal trend over the 
year within a given market, but the levels across markets differ. 
Table 1.1 Four Year Average Basis for 600-700lb Feed r Steers at Selected Markets 
Month 
Central 
Ky. 
Amarillo, 
TX Colorado 
West 
KS 
OK 
City Montana 
Jan 2.97 4.02 5.46 3.97 4.14 4.87 
Feb 4.93 6.03 8.07 5.91 7.10 8.47 
Mar 7.37 7.83 9.41 8.07 10.24 10.34 
Apr 8.36 6.76 10.62 9.80 11.21 12.34 
May 6.23 6.18 9.99 7.86 9.34 11.47 
Jun 7.09 5.72 7.67 4.89 8.16 10.22 
Jul 6.15 4.75 5.96 6.91 8.96 5.42 
Aug 3.25 3.37 4.37 5.67 6.82 4.29 
Sep 1.95 1.24 2.60 3.85 6.20 3.57 
Oct -0.17 -2.61 0.36 0.13 3.77 1.35 
Nov 1.20 1.04 1.47 1.28 4.99 0.34 
Dec 2.63 2.12 3.90 3.21 6.39 2.69 
Average 4.33 3.87 5.82 5.13 7.28 6.28 
 
  A reliable basis relationship is essential for hedging to be an effective tool in 
reducing price variability and locking in profitable prices. At the time a hedge is placed, 
hedgers must be able to predict the basis at the time of the cash sale within an acceptable 
range (Tonsor, Dhuyvetter, and Mintert). This aspect is extremely important to hedgers 
because the foundation for hedging is that basis must be easier to predict than outright 
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price movement. Historical basis estimates such as t ree and five year averages for a 
given local market are commonly used to predict future basis levels (Stasko).  
The basis formula can be rearranged to read: Cash = Basis + Futures. If producers 
know the estimated historical basis for the time period they will sell their cattle, they can 
simply add it to the futures price representing the month the cattle will be sold to arrive at 
an estimated cash price. This will give producers a cle rer picture of whether they can 
lock in a profit or not as long as they know the brakeven price for their cattle and have 
an accurate estimate of the expected basis.  
While futures and cash prices almost always move in the same direction, some 
times it will not be a one for one relationship. During times of bullishness in the market 
the cash price will generally rise faster than the futures price or cash prices will fall 
slower than the futures price (Stasko). This is know  as basis strengthening and can result 
in a market that discourages holding production to fu ure time periods. During times of 
bearishness the cash market will generally fall faster than the futures market or cash 
prices will rise slower than the futures price (Stasko). This is known as basis weakening 
and can result in a market that encourages producers to hold production into future time 
periods. Basis strength works in hedgers’ favor by giving them a larger gain or smaller 
loss in the cash market than the corresponding loss or gain in the futures hedge. 
Alternatively basis weakening hurts hedgers by giving them a larger loss or smaller gain 
in the cash market than the corresponding gain or loss in the futures hedge. Basis 
historically narrows at certain times of the year and widens at others due to seasonal 
supply and demand conditions in the cattle market. Some examples would be basis 
strength in the spring as demand for stocker cattle stimulates the cash market for feeder 
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cattle while the futures market generally gets resistance from anticipated higher supplies 
of live cattle in the summer months. In the late summer and fall basis generally weakens 
as seasonally larger supplies of feeder cattle weigh on the cash market while futures start 
to look toward holiday demand later in the fall.    
Changes in the basis that are not consistent with the istorical patterns are known 
as basis risk. A hedger exchanges price risk for this basis risk which is seen as smaller 
than outright movements in price. The cost of hedging comes from a lower average net 
price in exchange for eliminating price risk. Efficient hedging relies on the idea that basis 
is more predictable than outright price movement. If basis is not more predictable, then 
the hedger has not reduced any risk at all (Mintert).  
Goals and Objectives 
This research has four main goals. The first goal is to examine the basis 
relationships for six Kentucky markets to evaluate the effectiveness of short hedging. 
Hedging simulations were performed for 4 different hedge lengths at each market for five 
feeder cattle weight ranges. The results are present d i  mean-variance tables and tested 
to see if short hedging achieved its purpose of lowering the variability in net prices, thus 
reducing income variability and making production decisions easier. The next objective 
was to determine hedge ratios for different weights of feeder cattle. A hedge ratio is the 
optimal futures to cash position that minimizes the covariance between the cash and 
futures price changes relative to the variance of futures price changes (Stoll and Whaley). 
Typically a hedge ratio of one is assumed for most hedging strategies. That is a one to 
one relationship with respect to futures and cash position size. The reason for determining 
hedge ratios was to see what ratio of futures position to cash position sufficiently reduces 
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price risk for weights of feeder cattle that do notmeet feeder cattle futures specifications 
as a large portion of the feeder supply does not meet contract specs. The third objective 
was the construction of a model to describe some of the variables that affect the basis 
level for the Kentucky markets under study. The model was designed to give market 
participants an idea of some of the factors that affect Kentucky feeder cattle basis and the 
amount of impact. This model may also be used to form a forecast of basis as compared 
to historical basis levels. Having an accurate estimate of expected basis is essential to 
producers, order buyers, and broker/dealers attempting to lock in a profit with feeder 
cattle futures. The last objective is to present potential hedgers with advice on choosing a 
commodity broker and introduce some alternative hedging strategies. These strategies 
should be beneficial to producers, order buyers and dealers whether or not basis can be 
predicted within an acceptable range. The strategies section will focus on a technique 
using spreads in the live cattle market as a possible cross hedge for feeder cattle. Several 
different option strategies will also be presented that may be of lower cost than using 
short hedges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Nathaniel J. Routt 2006 
 7 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW  
Many economists use deferred futures as an estimate of th  cash price for future 
time periods. As long as the basis remains predictable nd the futures market is efficient 
this approach is an excellent way for producers to forecast cash prices (Kastens and 
Dhuyvetter). As far as actually being an accurate es imate of the cash price for some 
distant month in the future on any given day, it may not be that great because so many 
aggregate production decisions are not known and future demand is hard to predict. 
These issues make it especially difficult to forecast cash livestock prices. 
A good forecast is one that incorporates all information available at that time and 
makes the best estimate of what prices should be infuture if those conditions hold. 
Difficulty arises because there are many unknown factors that will almost certainly affect 
the accuracy of the forecast. Issues such as unexpect d border openings/closings and the 
level of herd building certainly have made it hard to predict feeder cattle prices in recent 
years. While deferred futures may not be a good estimate of where cash prices will be at 
the time of expiry, they do incorporate all known information at a point in time. This 
makes them as good as any private forecast of prices. D ferred futures prices are 
commonly used by producers to help make production decisions. Extension professionals 
also use deferred futures prices in research (Kastens and Dhuyvetter).  
Previous studies on Basis Variability in Kentucky   
Bobst did a similar study of basis variability in the fed cattle market and slaughter 
hogs in 1974. His study dealt with location basis variability. Bobst defined location basis 
variability as a distortion in hedging results that occurs because of a hedger’s location at 
some point distant from a futures contract delivery point (Bobst). While price is hard to 
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predict at any given market, the difference between markets should be stable over time 
and be approximately equal to transfer costs when perfect spatial competition exists. 
Spatial market efficiency holds when markets have perfect information, sufficient 
liquidity in buyers and sellers, no rigidity in transportation costs and relatively 
homogenous products (Bobst). In reality these conditions do not hold perfectly, so 
imperfect spatial competition is expected to exist. Location basis variability may or may 
not be present however. Each individual market must be examined to see if price variance 
is truly different across markets.  If location basis variability exists, it is an empirical 
question whether it has a significant effect on hedging results. If cash prices and futures 
prices are not correlated enough with each other, hedging can be rendered ineffective as a 
price risk management tool. It can actually reduce the net price received and increase the 
variability of those prices. The way of testing forsignificant location basis variability is 
through testing for equality of variance across markets. Bobst explains that while mean 
prices can and should vary across markets because of transportation costs the variance of 
those means should be statistically equal if locatin basis variability is not a problem. The 
Bobst study used 11 different hedge lengths and 4 different grade/sex combinations for 
fed cattle. The markets studied were Kentucky, Georgia, and the Southern Plains area of 
Texas and Oklahoma. Currently there is no defined fed cattle market in Kentucky or 
Georgia. The Southern Plains area is still a very important cattle feeding region in the 
US. Hedging efficiency was impacted by location basis variability for all the markets 
studied. Although hedging was deemed to increase variability of returns for some classes 
of cattle, Bobst argues that hedging with futures may still be a viable strategy because it 
transfers price risk away from the hedger (Bobst).  
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  O’Bryan did a similar study of basis variability and hedging efficiency in 1977 for 
Kentucky feeder cattle. O’Bryan chose several set hedge lengths based on standard feeder 
cattle back grounding procedures. He used 16, 20, 24, and 32 week hedging intervals for 
simulated hedges. He examined location basis variability etween the Bluegrass market, 
Bowling Green market, Louisville market, and the Oklahoma City market. Of these the 
Louisville market is no longer in operation, but at he time was the largest auction market 
in Kentucky. In all markets hedging reduced the variability of returns and reduced the 
average net return for feeder steers that met contract specifications as could be expected. 
In some weight classes and certain markets hedging actually increased the variability of 
returns and reduced the average returns. Six to seven hundred pound heifers at the 
Lexington market and Louisville market showed lower returns and higher variability for 
16 and 24 week hedging programs. Four to five hundred pound heifers at the Louisville 
market had more variable returns and lower average returns also. These results were 
harmful to hedgers because they were worse than simply taking the cash price at the time 
of sale. Hedging totally defeated the intended goal of reducing price risk in this case. This 
indicated that it was not worth doing a short hedge for those classes of cattle sold at the 
Lexington or Louisville markets. It is expected that edging will reduce the net price, but 
it is also expected to reduce the variability of those prices resulting in more stable returns 
for the hedger. It is possible that these results happened because lightweight heifers are 
far from feeder futures specifications. It could also have been the case that the number of 
lightweight heifers was too small to have an efficient market test.  
As a second goal of his thesis O’Bryan did observe downward bias or 
“backwardation” in the feeder cattle futures market similar to what Kolb, Kastens and 
 10 
Schroeder found. He offered an explanation of low open interest and trading volume in 
the feeder futures market as a possible cause. The major problem faced by the 32 week 
interval was a lack of liquidity in the deferred feeder futures contract. Some days would 
pass without a single trade in the contract 8 months out. Open interest was much less in 
1977 than it is today. For example in March of 1977 open interest averaged between 4000 
and 5000 contracts. In March of 2006 open interest ha  averaged between 34,000 and 
37,000 contracts. Volume and open interest are much higher now in feeder cattle futures 
than when O’Bryan did his study and it should be easier for a hedger to place a hedge in 
one of the deferred months now.  
Discussion of Market Efficiency in Livestock Markets  
Market efficiency can be defined as a market that does not offer arbitrage 
opportunities. The issue of market efficiency in cattle futures has been debated in the 
literature several times in the past (Kolb, Kastens a d Schroeder). Studies have been 
performed to test various trading programs to see if they can repeatedly extract profits 
from the market. (Kastens and Schroeder) The results how that the trading programs 
were able to provide consistent positive returns from a set of historical data, but were 
unable to show profits when applied to out of sample data. This adds credibility that the 
cattle futures market is efficient. Market efficiency generally increases as open interest 
increases. Open interest in cattle futures has grown substantially in recent years due to 
increased involvement of both commodity funds and commercial hedgers. Open interest 
in both live and feeder cattle futures are more than double what they were when many of 
the market efficiency tests were performed including the Kastens and Schroeder in 1995. 
Based on the increased liquidity and information avail bility it is likely that live cattle 
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and feeder cattle futures are more efficient than tey were five to ten years ago. It is more 
likely now that there is little to no bias in both feeder and live cattle futures. They provide 
good opportunity to hedgers of all sizes due to the increased liquidity and efficient 
pricing.  
On the other hand Kolb tested for “normal backwardation” and found significant 
statistical evidence of its presence in feeder and live cattle futures. The term normal 
backwardation was developed by John Keynes and refers to the idea that long speculators 
earn a premium from short hedgers over time in futures markets (Kolb). The futures price 
would consistently stay below the cash price until the contract moved close to expiration. 
This caused futures contracts to gain into expiry as they adjusted to converge with the 
cash price. Under this scenario it is assumed short hedgers’ main goal was risk aversion. 
They would be willing to sell futures at a discount to he current cash price in order to 
have price protection. Kolb did not consider the case of differing risk aversion levels for 
individuals on a risk efficient frontier. Keynes developed this theory in the 1930’s and 
didn’t have the tools that are available today to test for market efficiency. His theory used 
the simple assumption that all speculators were long and hedgers were short. Keynes did 
not address the situation when there are both long hed ers and short hedgers and the case 
of speculators on both sides of the market. It would seem that as markets have become 
more diverse and information is cheaper to acquire that backwardation would not hold in 
any commodity market. However, the question of whether backwardation is normal or 
not is still unsatisfactorily answered sixty years fter Keynes developed his theory 
according to Kolb.  
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Some commodities such as Cattle, hogs, and feeders xhibit strong evidence of 
backwardation (Kolb). Kastens and Schroeder found similar results in their test of market 
efficiency in live cattle futures. On the other hand, energy futures showed strong 
statistical evidence against backwardation (Kolb). Other commodities such as grains and 
metals did not show strong statistical evidence either way (Kolb). It makes sense 
intuitively that livestock futures would gain into expiry. Since production decisions made 
each day by producers affect future cash prices it is hard to predict where cash will be 
two or three months in the future and extremely difficult six or eight months out. Due to 
this type of uncertainty it may be possible that there is a discount built into livestock 
futures.  
It is feasible that no discount or premium would exist for some commodities such 
as grain because production decisions cannot be changed after planting season. It also 
makes sense that energy markets would show the opposite of backwardation. Since 
fossil-fuel energy is non-renewable and supply is constantly being depleted it is possible 
that premiums would be built into the market for future delivery. The results that Kolb 
found seem feasible even though no sweeping conclusion can be made about 
backwardation. It may be sufficient to say that backwardation is normal in some markets 
on average and not normal in others on average. In some commodities it may show up in 
some years and not in others. It is not a definitive answer, but may be of some use to the 
hedger for background information. In feeder cattle and live cattle futures the short 
hedgers may be risk adverse enough to be willing seller  at discounted prices. They may 
be willing to take a lower price in exchange for lower variability in returns. This is 
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consistent with Keynes theory, but does not address long hedgers such as beef packers 
and meat wholesalers.  
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CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF THE CME FEEDER CATTLE FUT URES 
CONTRACT  
The CME started trading feeder cattle futures in 1971 which was two years after it 
introduced live cattle futures. These contracts differed from the contracts on storable 
commodities that had dominated for many years. These n w contracts offered producers 
of cattle a way to manage risk and also offered speculators a chance to make profits from 
the cattle industry without having to actually purchase physical cattle. At the time the 
contract was 42,000 pounds in size. The contract has since changed to 50,000 pounds to 
more accurately reflect a semi truck load of feeder cattle.  
Starting with the September 1986 contract, feeder cattle futures changed from a 
delivery contract to cash settlement (Elam). The change from delivery to cash settlement 
was made to eliminate grading disputes on delivered fe er cattle and lower basis risk, 
according to Kilcollin, Elam, Schroeder and Mintert. S udies performed after the change 
to cash settlement support the hypothesis of lower basis risk with cash settlement (Paul).   
Cash Settlement Index 
The calculation of the cash settlement index is important to ensuring an efficient 
market. USDA market reporters attend auction sales held in a twelve state region 
encompassing most of the Midwest and provide a description of cattle that sold as well as 
the price of those cattle. The twelve states are: Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wyoming, 
and Texas. The cash settlement feeder cattle index is calculated from data obtained from 
USDA market reports from those twelve states. Only feeder steers that meet the weight 
range and quality standards of the index are included.  Currently the index includes #1 
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and #2 large and medium frame feeder steers from 650 to 849 pounds excluding any 
animals denoted as fleshy or value enhanced. The index is a seven business day average 
of the cash prices weighted by the weight of the cattle.  
The index has two pieces and is calculated as follows:  
(Total # head *average weight * average price = total dollars for each sale location). 
Seven days worth of total dollars is added together to get the numerator in calculating the 
index. The denominator of the index calculation is the total weight. It is calculated as: 
(Total head * average weight = total weight for each sale location) 
The total weight for each sale location is added together to get the cumulative total 
weight for that day. After seven days of data are colle ted and aggregated the formula 
then can be stated:  
(Seven days total dollars/Seven days total weight).  
The value that comes from this formula is used to cash settle the feeder cattle 
futures contract. The oldest day data is deleted out of the index when a new day is 
included. The published index is always for the previous day because generally it takes a 
day to get the market reports collected from each sle location. Some nimble traders can 
figure the index within 20 – 30 points before it is published, which keeps the spot feeder 
contract fairly priced going into expiry. 
Recent Changes to the Cash Settlement Index  
The CME staff has approved a measure that will include cattle that are denoted as 
calves by market reporters in the index starting with the March 2007 contract in order to 
provide a larger sample of cash feeder prices. The concern is that during certain times of 
the year the index may not accurately reflect cash feeder prices due to the small number 
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of feeder cattle included. At times the number of cattle in the index has fallen below 
15,000 head. The maximum number of contracts allowed per trader in the spot feeder 
month for the last ten days of trading is 300 which represents about 20,000 head of feeder 
cattle. Many of the trading firms at the CME do notwant to see the limit lowered, so 
including more cattle in the index is seen as a wayto keep the 300 contract limit viable. 
Typically larger traders start reducing position size several weeks before the 300 limit 
takes effect. This results in orderly liquidation of the spot month. Typically less than 
3000 contracts are left open at expiry to be cash settled with the feeder cattle index. Firms 
at the CME want to keep the limits large because it increases market liquidity and adds to 
exchange and trading firm profitability.    
One issue that some market participants have raised is the possibility of 
expanding the cash index reporting area to more than t e current twelve states. Although 
the CME opinion is that this is not necessary, it cer ainly would add more liquidity to the 
index. Adding states such as Kentucky to the feeder cattle index should decrease basis 
variability and improve hedging efficiency. In the future it may be necessary to include 
some Eastern and Southeastern states if the measure of adding “calves” fails to add 
enough feeder cattle to the index. Most feeder cattle produced in the Southeast are 
shipped to the Midwest and Plains states for finishg and it makes sense intuitively to 
include them in the calculation of the feeder cattle index.  
Trading Environment 
 In the early days of trading cattle and feeder cattle futures the volume and open 
interest were small when compared to today. Information was not as widely or quickly 
available, which kept many people from trading or using these new products for risk 
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management. In those early days the main players were beef packers, professional floor 
traders and large feedlot operations. In the 1970’s fortunes were made by professional 
traders with the help of inside information from sources in the beef packing industry 
(Bromagen). Many of the veteran traders of that era say that it is much harder to trade the 
market now because of the increased liquidity and transparency in the market 
(Bromagen). This is anecdotal evidence that the market has become more efficient over 
time as market information has become available quickly to anyone. Transaction costs 
have been reduced significantly due to the internet a d discount trading firms and due to 
the wide number of participants in cattle and feeder cattle futures. Commodity hedge 
funds have dramatically added to the liquidity in many commodity futures markets. Gone 
are days when floor traders could team up with the large beef packers to force the market 
in the direction they wanted. Floor traders sometims try to press the market into sell 
stops or buy stops in order to get the market moving in their favor when volume is light, 
but increased liquidity has made this strategy not as profitable as it once was (Brooks).  
It has been said that the commodity funds manipulate the market and force it in 
the direction they want it to go, and that can be tru for a while because they have so 
much capital to apply to their position, but the spot month will conform to the 
fundamental conditions of the market as expiry nears. Commodity funds sometimes 
referred to as hedge funds are today’s “giant elephants” in the market that move at 
various times for a variety of reasons. Fund money comes into the market from various 
sources. Some major sources are pension plans, mutual f nds, insurance companies, 
institutional endowments, a few wealthy individuals nd proprietary trading firms. For 
the most part commodity funds do not seek the smaller individual investor. They do 
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distort prices and spread relationships at times, but this creates opportunities that 
professional floor traders exploit to their advantage. The end result is that prices and 
spreads return to levels that are justifiable given the fundamental conditions in the 
market. Market efficiency is achieved even with commodity funds as today’s largest 
participants in cattle and feeder cattle futures. Some producers condemn the commodity 
fund traders as manipulators that hurt the cattle industry, but the funds really help by 
providing good hedging opportunities and extra liquidity to offset risk.  
Electronic Markets and Liquidity Issues 
The CME now offers electronically traded contracts on feeder cattle and live 
cattle (CME). They trade at the same time the pit traded products trade and are identical 
in all aspects to the pit traded contracts. The CME assigned five market makers to 
provide liquidity in these markets in January 2006 with the hopes of increasing the use of 
these markets. Their use has grown, but volume rarely exceeds one thousand contracts 
per day for both live and feeder contracts together. As long as the pit traded and 
electronic markets trade at the same times it is unlikely that the electronic markets will 
achieve much popularity. If the electronic markets traded during times when the pit 
traded markets were closed, (similar to the grains markets), a modest amount of interest 
in them could be stimulated.  
Live cattle and feeder cattle futures are different from many of the financial and 
even other agricultural futures markets because they ar  smaller and the desire to move to 
an all electronic market has not arisen. In many of the currency, interest rate and stock 
index futures contracts the major market is the electronic market and in some cases it is 
the only market. One main advantage to the electroni  markets is extremely fast order 
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execution and fill reporting, many times less than one minute. However, this aspect is 
more important to the speculator than the hedger in most cases. The floor traders at the 
CME also value their jobs and may be resistant to more electronic trading in the cattle 
and feeders. One floor trader described the situation as a small, close knit group of people 
that like things the way they are (Cawthorne). Of course if trading volume becomes 
overwhelming it may be necessary to execute more trades on the electronic platform in 
the future. This may be happening in the grains as volumes and open interest are much 
higher in those markets. With the current system it can take more than an hour to get 
filled orders reported to customers in the corn and soybean market when trading is heavy. 
The problem arises when floor brokers get a steady flow of orders to fill and don’t have 
the time to stop and report fill prices. It is possible that cattle and feeders could get to that 
point, but the current system still functions well in most market conditions. Only when 
trading volume is extremely heavy it can take more than an hour to get fills reported. 
Liquidity in the feeder cattle market is more of an issue than in the live cattle 
market. Open interest is almost eight times greater in the live cattle market. This would 
indicate that commercial interest in feeder cattle futures is not as good as it could be. 
According to Elam (1986), only a small portion of the US feeder cattle supply is hedged 
using feeder cattle futures. Elam blamed the lack of use on problems with the physical 
delivery contract. It has been 20 years since the contract switched to cash settlement and 
interest in the contract has increased, but still lags behind the live cattle market. It is 
possible that some feeder cattle are hedged with live cattle contracts, but unlikely that a 
large number are hedged this way. There could be a variety of reasons commercials are 
not fully utilizing the feeder cattle futures contract. Feeder cattle production is less 
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concentrated than live cattle production and as a result it may be less likely that smaller 
producers will use futures to hedge. Since the definition of feeder cattle includes more 
than just 650 to 849 pound #1 steers it could be possible that producers may be leery of 
using feeder cattle futures to hedge animals that do not fit the contract weight or grade 
specifications. Prospective hedgers may also feel that basis risk is too great for their 
individual market to make hedging a risk reducing activity. It may be possible to increase 
producer use of feeder cattle futures and options with education about the benefits of 
reducing price risk.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY 
My hypothesis is that feeder cattle basis is predictable enough to make hedging 
with feeder futures a profitable and price risk reducing activity when dealing with load 
lots of feeder steers and heifers. A load lot is a group of cattle that is large enough to fill a 
semi truck trailer. This is the way cattle are transported from Kentucky to the major 
feeding areas in the Midwest. Selling cattle in load lots eliminates the need for order 
buyers to piece loads together. This can lead to more efficient bids because a load lot is 
immediately ready for shipment. In the case of small groups of cattle the buyer can’t 
immediately ship them so bids may reflect a discount relative to the market for load lots. 
Also if a buyer needs to finish a load lot the bid may reflect a premium relative to the 
market for load lots. The end result is that the basis for smaller groups should be more 
volatile than the basis for load lots.   
The method of analysis would be to calculate basis for regional Kentucky markets 
using individual groups of cattle sold at those locations. Then, short hedging simulations 
would be performed to see if price risk was reduced for producers selling in those various 
regional markets. This should help answer the question “Is hedging with feeder cattle 
futures efficient for the Kentucky producer?” with a certain degree of accuracy.  
One consideration is the risk preference of an indiv dual producer. A risk adverse 
individual may be willing to stay 100% hedged and attempt to adhere to the hedge ratio 
that represents the grade and weight cattle they will sell. Many others may opt to hedge 
only a portion of their cattle, leaving the rest open to benefit if prices rise. Others may 
evaluate the situation with each set of cattle they buy or raise and make a decision 
whether to hedge or not based on their own expectations or an expert forecast. 
 22 
Data Description and Hedging Simulations    
The data used in my model was collected from weekly Kentucky Livestock and 
Grain Market Reports from October 2000 to January 2005. The data are prices of feeder 
steers and heifers that sold in individual lots of at least 20 head. The markets included 
were Bluegrass, Bluegrass CPH, Ky-Tenn market in Guthrie, KY, Producers Owenton, 
Producers Paris and Paris CPH. The Bluegrass CPH and P ris CPH were special sales at 
those locations of weaned calves and feeder cattle that that had been through a quality 
enhancing program. Of special note is that the Ky.-Tenn. market in Guthrie, KY is an in-
weigh market. The cattle are weighed as they arrive at the sale rather than when they 
enter the sale ring. Between the time the cattle arrive and are sold they will lose weight 
and knowing this, buyers will discount the price. This is a reason why the average price is 
lower at the Ky. Tenn. market.  
The Oklahoma City market data came from the Livestock Marketing Information 
Center. It is compared to the Kentucky markets for illustrative purposes. The Oklahoma 
City market was chosen over other Midwestern markets b cause of the large volume of 
cattle that are sold there each week and the perception that it is an efficient market. The 
data for all futures prices originally came from the CME, but were obtained from the 
Livestock Marketing Information Center  
The following tables show the results of hedging simulations for each Kentucky 
market and the Oklahoma City market. These simulations were performed by assuming 
producers hedged their cattle 4, 5, 6, or 8 months before the date of the cash sale. The 
choice of these time periods is consistent with various back-grounding lengths (O’Bryan). 
The short hedge was placed at the closing price of the day 4, 5, 6 or 8 months prior to the 
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cash sale. These hedges were then lifted on the date of the cash sale and the hedge 
revenue added to the cash price. The results for the no hedge strategy are presented for 
comparison purposes to show that hedging reduced price variability on average for the 
more liquid markets.  
The Bartlett test was used to test for equality of variance across markets within 
each of the four strategies and the no hedge or cash price strategy. The Bartlett test is 
based on an approximation of the F-Distribution (Dixon and Massey). 
Table 4.1 Cash and Short Hedging Results for 650-849 Pound Feeder Steers That 
Meet CME Contract Specifications 
Market Bluegrass 
BG 
CPH Ky.-Tenn Owenton Paris Paris CPH OKC 
F - 
Stat 
         
Cash Price         
Mean 89.82 92.69 88.66 87.44 90.71 100.58 94.73  
Variance 146.42 117.93 146.03 136.54 157.49 69.46 145.81 0.92 
number of        0.18* 
observations 1310 53 202 90 183 18 432   
Hedging revenue             
Statistics         
8 month         
Mean 84.69 85.69 82.87 85.03 86.37 88.31 90.32  
Variance 34.26 41.02 37.16 33.48 31.58 27.44 33.41 0.45 
        .35* 
6 month         
Mean 85.23 87.73 83.8 85.2 86.64 95.26 90.82  
Variance 46.26 85.16 47.04 43.25 42.71 125.59 47.39 3.99 
        .23* 
5 month         
Mean  85.81 88.92 84.4 85.74 87.09 98.6 91.28  
Variance 57.71 102.46 56.31 55.89 54.68 142.76 59.22 3.29 
        .13* 
4 month         
Mean 86.41 90.43 84.99 86.01 87.59 98.64 91.81  
Variance 67.4 103.38 68.27 66.93 69.96 149.88 73.07 2.06 
                .28* 
 The F- critical value is 2.09 at the α = .05 level  
* These are the F – Stat values when Bluegrass CPH and Paris CPH are ommitted 
  
The previous table represents prices for feeder stes hat meet the contract 
specifications for the CME feeder cattle futures contract. There is no significant 
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difference in variances across markets for the no hedge strategy. This is consistent with 
the theory introduced by Bobst that variances should be equal across markets. It gives 
some credibility to the smaller Kentucky markets that they are efficient when groups of 
20 head or more go through the sale ring. The variances for the 5 and 6 month hedging 
simulations do show statistical differences in variance of price across the seven markets. 
Without testing each variance individually against the other variances it is not possible to 
tell which variances are different and which are equal except that the high and low 
variance of the group are unequal (O’Bryan). The Paris CPH results show lower average 
price and higher variance for the 4, 5, and 6 month hedging simulations as compared to 
the no hedge strategy. These results indicate that hedging was ineffective at the Paris 
CPH market for those three hedge lengths. Both the Blu grass and Paris CPH sales 
suffered from a small number of observations. It islikely that this had an impact on the 
results. The Bartlett test was run omitting the Bluegrass CPH and Paris CPH markets and 
the F-stat has a star beside it under the original test statistics. The results showed no 
significant difference in variance at the 95% confidence level for any of the hedging 
simulations across markets. These results favor the use of feeder cattle futures as a price 
risk management tool for Kentucky producers in the more liquid markets for feeder steers 
that weigh between 650 and 850 pounds. 
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Table 4.2 Cash and Short Hedging Results for 400-500lb. Stocker Steers 
Market Bluegrass 
BG 
CPH 
Ky.-
Tenn OKC F - Stat 
      
Cash Price      
Mean 108.28 111.49 101.97 113.48  
Variance 152.29 293.84 160.96 163.92 0.75 
     0.18* 
Number of      
observations 38 12 287 216   
Hedging revenue       
statistics      
      
8 month      
Mean 100.39 104.79 96.22 109.07  
Variance 91.08 167.72 95.49 70.38 1.79 
     1.42* 
6 month      
Mean 101.5 105.8 96.57 109.57  
Variance 103.71 280.47 112.69 96.01 3.07 
     0.57* 
5 month      
Mean  103.58 106.19 97.18 110.03  
Variance 134.97 320.1 125.79 110.89 2.84 
     0.45* 
4 month      
Mean 105.07 106.87 97.85 110.56  
Variance 137.39 325.64 133.76 122.84 2.57 
          0.31* 
 
The F- critical value is 2.09 at the α = .05 level  
* These are the F – Stat values when Bluegrass CPH and Paris CPH are ommitted 
   
These results are similar to those for contract spec t ers, but hedging was 
ineffective for the 4, 5, and 6 month hedge simulations at the Bluegrass CPH market. It is 
reasonable to believe that basis variability would be higher for cattle that do not meet the 
contract specifications and that is shown in this table. However, when Owenton and both 
CPH markets are left out, no significant difference in variance is present as indicated by 
the F-stats with stars beside them. The number of observations is small for Owenton and 
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both CPH markets which may exaggerate the variance. This is why they were left out of 
the table  
Table 4.3 Cash and Short Hedging Results for 801lbs. and Greater Feeder Steers 
Market Bluegrass Owenton Paris OKC 
F - 
Stat 
      
Cash Price      
Mean 85.58 84.97 84.88 87.97 0.98 
Variance 149.2 114.98 122.58 130.96  
      
number of      
observations 1231 37 98 216   
Hedging revenue       
statistics      
8 month      
Mean 80.95 80.78 82.51 83.05 9.76 
Variance 40.28 25.4 20.4 21.05  
      
6 month      
Mean 81.55 82.92 82.3 83.56 4.53 
Variance 49.06 63.02 29.58 34.07  
      
5 month      
Mean  82.02 83.97 82.6 84.02 2.84 
Variance 60.35 82.74 44.13 45.31  
      
4 month      
Mean 82.42 84.58 82.67 84.55 2.43 
Variance 75.41 81.47 52.05 57.82   
The F- critical value is 2.09 at the α = .05 level  
 
The results for 800 pounds and greater feeder steers show differences in variance 
for all of the hedge simulations across markets. Even when Bluegrass CPH and Ky-Tenn. 
are excluded the hypothesis that the variances are equal is rejected. The Bluegrass CPH 
market had variances that were higher than the no hedge strategy for the 4, 5, and 6 
month hedge strategies. However, it is hard to make any concrete statement about the true 
effectiveness of hedging 800 pounds and greater feeder cattle for the Bluegrass CPH 
market because of the small sample size.  
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Table 4.4 Cash and Short Hedging Results for 400-500lb. Stocker Heifers 
Market Bluegrass 
BG 
CPH 
Ky.-
Tenn Owenton OKC 
F - 
Stat 
       
Cash Price       
Mean 95.12 101.3 92.85 93.4 100.6 0.85 
Variance 177.44 234.2 156.8 107.87 153.8  
       
number of       
observations 63 16 451 11 216   
Hedging revenue         
statistics       
8 month       
Mean 88.94 92.92 88.27 90.45 81.56 21.84 
Variance 87.49 133.31 83.2 144.87 20.69  
       
6 month       
Mean 89.61 95.34 88.63 90.64 96.7 2.96 
Variance 118.71 213.33 96.45 149.09 88.73  
       
5 month       
Mean  91.19 96.46 89.33 91.33 97.16 2.74 
Variance 156.61 236.66 111.03 166.28 102.5  
       
4 month       
Mean 91.43 98.24 89.7 91.88 97.68 2.26 
Variance 163.21 236.92 116.58 190.94 114   
The F- critical value is 2.09 at the α = .05 level  
 
The results for lightweight heifers show significant difference in variance across 
all markets for the four hedging simulations. It is likely that the further the cattle are from 
contract specifications the greater the possibility that basis variability will be an issue. 
For the Bluegrass CPH market the price variance was higher for the 4 and 5 month 
simulations. Price variance was higher for all four hedge simulations for the Owenton 
market.  
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Table 4.5 Cash and Short Hedging Results for 501-600lb. Stocker Heifers 
Market Bluegrass 
BG 
CPH 
Ky.-
Tenn Owenton Paris OKC 
F - 
Stat 
        
Cash Price        
Mean 89.78 98.87 88.05 93.96 86.67 94.5 1.47 
Variance 114.78 142.34 138.25 116.4 72.21 141.4  
        
number of        
observations 195 34 384 20 39 216   
Hedging revenue           
statistics        
        
8 month        
Mean 84.47 90.4 82.41 86.1 84.54 90.09 3.07 
Variance 59.61 78.86 62.99 41.54 87.55 42.54  
        
6 month        
Mean 85.91 92.95 83.18 87.31 85.39 90.59 2.39 
Variance 74.97 122.04 73.12 73.13 77.67 60.98  
        
5 month        
Mean  87.07 93.76 83.87 88.75 85.65 91.05 2.41 
Variance 88.37 141.61 80.16 99.69 67.62 71.41  
        
4 month        
Mean 87.51 94.97 84.17 90.54 86.49 91.58 2.28 
Variance 93.68 148.65 81.71 89.54 65.16 81.88   
The F- critical value is 2.09 at the α = .05 level  
 
 The F-stats show difference in variance across markets for all four hedge 
strategies for 500-600 pound heifers. The Bluegrass CPH market showed more variable 
prices for the 4 month simulation. Price variance was higher for the six and eight month 
simulations at the Owenton market than for the no hedge strategy. Hedging was not 
effective for those two simulations.   
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Table 4.6 Cash and Short Hedging Results for 601-700lb. Feeder Heifers 
Market Bluegrass 
Bluegrass 
CPH 
Ky.-
Tenn Owenton Paris OKC 
F - 
Stat 
        
Cash Price        
Mean 86.11 88.71 84.25 88.86 82.59 90.02 0.458 
Variance 109.23 120.53 120.11 106.8 101.9 131.3  
        
number of        
observations 322 23 229 20 39 216   
Hedging revenue           
statistics        
        
8 month        
Mean 81.6 82.13 78.11 85.04 81.99 85.61 2.52 
Variance 38.21 44.54 35.97 40 43.06 24.62  
        
6 month        
Mean 82.45 83.91 78.82 86.81 82.49 86.11 3.23 
Variance 50.59 103 46.23 61.28 45.37 38.36  
        
5 month        
Mean  83.09 85.23 79.64 87.99 82.36 86.57 2.81 
Variance 56.08 130.01 56.74 62.19 60.83 49.13  
        
4 month        
Mean 83.69 86.21 80.08 88.83 82.73 87.1 1.76 
Variance 66.31 126.38 65.59 71.76 52.03 60.8   
The F- critical value is 2.09 at the α = .05 level  
 
 The results for 600-700 pound heifers are similar to those for 500-600 pound 
heifers. Significant difference in variance exists for all but the 4 month hedging 
simulation. Price variability was greater than cash price variability for the 4 and 5 month 
simulations at the Bluegrass CPH market.   
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Table 4.7 Cash and Short Hedging Results for 701-800lb. Feeder Heifers 
Market Bluegrass 
Ky.-
Tenn Owenton Paris OKC 
F - 
Stat 
       
Cash Price       
Mean 85.08 83.58 82.51 79.51 85.97 0.99 
Variance 137.67 118.92 76.21 84.91 126.58  
       
number of       
observations 308 49 23 16 216   
Hedging revenue         
statistics       
       
8 month       
Mean 79.97 73.64 78.74 78.17 81.56 0.85 
Variance 25.61 29.18 23.08 30.36 20.69  
       
6 month       
Mean 80.66 74.53 79.95 78.94 82.06 0.87 
Variance 35.17 49.62 44.74 26.66 34.51  
       
5 month       
Mean  81.45 75.68 80.53 79.74 82.53 1.22 
Variance 46.8 71.57 49.97 30.33 45.35  
       
4 month       
Mean 81.71 77.08 81.46 79.54 83.05 0.46 
Variance 56.16 76.6 62.81 55.15 57.38   
The F- critical value is 2.09 at the α = .05 level  
 
 The results for heavier heifers show no significant difference in variance for any 
of the hedging simulations. The overall variance in prices is less as the feeder heifers get 
heavier. These are encouraging results that support the effectiveness of hedging for 700-
800 pound heifers. The next table is for 800 pounds and greater heifers. 
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Table 4.8 Cash and Short Hedging Results for 801lbs. and Greater Feeder Heifers 
Market Bluegrass Ky.-Tenn OKC F - Stat 
     
Cash Price     
Mean 80.89 79.31 81.46  
Variance 135.53 154.43 113.6 0.76 
number of     
observations 77 4 185   
Hedging revenue     
statistics     
     
8 month     
Mean 77.21 67.78 77.53  
Variance 23.58 6.61 20.74 0.45 
     
6 month     
Mean 77.75 68.38 77.91  
Variance 32.3 7.21 32.19 0.76 
     
5 month     
Mean  78.68 70.37 78.12  
Variance 38.49 4.56 37.7 1.19 
     
4 month     
Mean 79.35 69.94 78.51  
Variance 53.51 0.99 45.6 2.81 
The F- critical value is 2.09 at the α = .05 level  
 
 The results for 800 pounds and greater heifers show significant difference in 
variance across markets only for the 4 month hedge simulation. Hedging achieved its 
purpose of reducing price variability at all markets for the four hedge lengths. The small 
sample size for these heavy heifers suggests the results may not be as valid as those for 
the lighter weight heifers and steers. 
 Of important note is that there was no significant difference in variance across 
markets for the cash price for any class of steers or heifers at the 5% significance level. 
This adds credibility that the cash markets are effici nt. An efficient market does not 
provide significant arbitrage opportunities across space or time dimensions. In theory the 
difference in price across markets should be a result of transportation costs between 
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markets. Also, there are differences in quality of cattle across geographical areas that can 
cause differences in price to exist between markets.  
It would appear that some location basis variability is present for feeder cattle 
weights that differ from the futures contract specifications. It is difficult to say that spatial 
inefficiency exists between markets because feeder cattle are not a homogenous 
commodity. Factors such as breed, weight, gender, health and perceived genetic quality 
help determine the value of an individual set of cattle (Eldridge). It is possible that these 
factors are influencing the smaller sample sizes for ome of the markets. However, 
hedging achieved its purpose of reducing price variability for the larger markets in 
Kentucky. This was the case for all classes of feeder cattle for the Bluegrass market and 
for most classes at the Owenton and Ky.-Tenn market. The liquid Oklahoma City market 
results also showed efficient hedging results. 
Description of the Model to Predict Kentucky Feeder Cattle Basis 
A Generalized Least Squares model was used to describ  the Kentucky feeder 
cattle basis to better explain some of the variables that are thought to affect the spread 
between futures and cash. Some data in the model not previously described is the data for 
cattle slaughter which came from the Livestock Marketing Information Center. It is the 
percentage of heifer slaughter in total cattle slaughter. The demand index data came from 
Kansas State University. It is a measure of beef demand using 1998 as the base year. It is 
important to note that there was an increase in beef demand over the study time period.  
 The basis prediction model is presented on the following page. 
 33 
Ky. Basis = f (corn price, deferred live cattle futures price, ratio of heifer slaughter, head 
count, marketings, beef demand index, black hided, holsteins, dsteer, dummy variable 
for month, dummy variable for weight, dummy variable for market) 
 The variable for corn was expected to have a negative impact on Kentucky basis. 
This is because corn is an important input to the cattle feeding sector. As much as 80% of 
the grain fed to cattle during their lifecycle is corn (Eldridge). Changes in corn prices 
affect cattle feeders’ demand for feeder cattle. As the price of corn increases, it becomes 
more expensive to feed cattle and as a result feeder cattle prices should fall and thus basis 
could be expected to weaken.  
The variable for deferred live cattle futures named “deflcfut” in the model, is 
expected to have a positive effect on basis. The value of feeder cattle today is dependent 
on what cattle feeders expect the fed cattle market to be like when the feeder cattle are 
ready for slaughter. The choice of the deferred live cattle month assumes cattle will gain 
three pounds per day in a feedlot (Eldridge). As deferr d live cattle futures move higher, 
it should cause feedlot operators to be more optimis c about the future and bid feeder 
cattle prices higher. As the supply of feeder cattle diminishes, the cash feeder market 
should lead feeder futures prices higher and the market will move towards inversion. That 
is when the cash price is higher than the futures pices and a producer has no incentive to 
hold cattle to a future time period. The basis should strengthen as a result.   
 The variable for ratio of heifer slaughter named “ratiohfsl” in the model is 
expected to have a negative impact on basis. As heifers make up a larger percentage of 
total slaughter it is expected that producers are eith r liquidating herds or at least not 
holding heifers back to expand the herd. This should weaken the basis with an emphasis 
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on heifer basis in particular. However, it is possible that late in the liquidation phase of 
the cattle cycle this variable may have a positive eff ct on basis as there may be a lag 
between the time when prices for feeder cattle start to firm due to the low supply of cattle 
and heifer slaughter falls significantly. The data came from the 2000 – 2005 time period, 
which was late in the liquidation phase of the cattle cycle. 
 The variable headcount named “headcnt” in the model captures the size of each 
lot of cattle that was sold. It is assumed that as headcount increases basis should 
strengthen as a result of buyers placing a premium on load lots of feeder cattle.  
 The variable marketings is expected to have a negativ  effect on basis. As the 
supply of feeder cattle coming to market increases, it should put pressure on the cash 
price in Kentucky relative to other areas and cause the basis to weaken. 
 The variable for the beef demand index, named “dmdindex” in the model, is 
expected to have a positive effect on the basis. As beef demand rises it should add 
strength to beef prices and work through the marketing chain to strengthen feeder cattle 
prices. This could strengthen the basis, but it is unclear how much of an effect it will have 
because it does not have a direct impact on feeder cattle prices. Even though a positive 
effect on prices is expected, it may be possible that basis levels wouldn’t be affected 
significantly. 
 The dummy variable for black hided cattle, called “blacks” in the model, is 
expected to have a positive effect on basis. Black hided cattle have a reputation for 
grading better and superior performance in the feedlot. There may also be premiums 
associated with the Certified Angus Beef marketing program (Eldridge). If feedlots desire 
black hided cattle over other breeds it should cause the basis to be stronger as a result. 
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 The dummy variable for Holsteins is expected to have  negative impact on basis. 
Holstein dairy cattle sell at a discount to beef cattle because they aren’t as efficient in 
feedlots and don’t produce as much beef. Since they ar  far from the contract 
specifications for feeder cattle futures the basis is expected to be weaker. 
 The dummy variable for steers is expected to have a positive effect on basis. 
Steers are more efficient than heifers in the feedlot and are expected to command a 
stronger basis as a result.  
 The dummy variables for month represent each month f t e year with November 
as the base month. Feeder cattle basis is expected to be stronger in the spring months 
because of strong demand especially for lightweight calves to put on grass. In the fall, 
basis is expected to be weaker because that is when the majority of calves come to 
market. The demand for feeder cattle is less becaus fewer individuals have the means to 
background cattle through the winter and the cost of doing so is greater also. The months 
of March, April and May are expected to be positive for basis and the months of 
September, October and December are expected to be negative for basis. 
 The dummy variables for market represent the Kentucky markets studied. It is 
assumed that the larger markets will have a stronger basis due to increased competition 
from more buyers and cattle. It is also assumed that the CPH sales would generate a 
stronger basis because those cattle have been through a health preconditioning program 
that feedlots may view as an added value. The Ky.-Tenn. market is an in-weigh market 
meaning the cattle are weighed in advance of the sale. Since cattle are expected to lose 
weight when they are left in pens the actual weight purchased will be less than what is 
paid for. The cattle receive a discount in price relative to markets that are not in-weigh. 
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The cattle at the Ky.-Tenn market should also see a significantly weaker basis when 
compared to non in-weigh markets as a result. 
 The dummy variables for weights are assumed to have a negative impact on basis. 
The 800 and up weight class was used as the base. Lighter weight feeder cattle are 
expected to have a stronger basis simply because the price is higher relative to the futures 
price representing 650 – 849 pound feeder steers. As feeder cattle get closer to slaughter 
weight feedlots bid a discount because they are purchasing pounds that someone else has 
added to the cattle. 
Diagnostics 
The model was tested for multi-collinearity using a Variance Inflation test in 
SAS. All of the test statistics were less than ten meaning that multi-collinearity was not 
severe. 
 A RESET test was performed in SAS to see if a linear model was appropriate for 
the data. The model failed the test suggesting that a linear model may not be appropriate 
for the data. However, it is more likely that some i portant variable was omitted from 
the model as other model specifications were not more helpful in explaining the data.  
 The model was tested for auto-correlation with a Durbin-Watson statistic. Auto-
correlation is a problem with time series data when errors from one time period are 
related to errors in the next time period. The Ordinary Least Squares model showed 
significant auto-correlation. This problem was corrected with a first order lag variable of 
the errors. The model is known as a Generalized Least Squares model after correcting for 
auto-correlation (Wooldridge). 
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Results from Basis Model 
The following table shows the results from the basis prediction model. It is 
important to note the first column is the variable or parameter name. The second column 
is the parameter estimate, third column is the standard error of the estimate, and the 
fourth column denotes whether the parameter was significant at the 95% level. The total 
R2 for the regression was 79%. This meant that 79% of the variation in basis was 
described by the independent variables. 
Table 4.9 Regression Results: Factors Affecting Basis for Kentucky Markets 
Variable 
name parameter 
std. 
error 
Significant 
at 5% level 
Intercept -46.19 2.42 Yes 
Corn 1.63 0.18 Yes 
Deflcfut 0.22 0.014 Yes 
ratiohfsl 0.32 0.049 Yes 
headcnt 0.00046 0.0019 No 
marketings -0.086 0.012 Yes 
dmdindex 0.0202 0.015 No 
blacks 0.375 0.151 Yes 
holsteins -17.51 0.23 Yes 
steer 8.0047 0.132 Yes 
Jan 3.49 0.279 Yes 
Feb -1.12 0.29 Yes 
Mar 6.37 0.269 Yes 
Apr 7.27 0.282 Yes 
May 5.95 0.307 Yes 
June 1.26 0.285 Yes 
July 1.63 0.31 Yes 
Aug 1.756 0.304 Yes 
Sep -0.138 0.296 No 
Oct -1.494 0.265 Yes 
Dec -0.512 0.276 No 
Owenton -0.091 0.289 No 
CPH 3.79 0.32 Yes 
KYTenn -3.08 0.163 Yes 
Paris 0.091 0.254 No 
Twosthrees 26.44 0.383 Yes 
Fours 18.24 0.244 Yes 
Fives 12.88 0.205 Yes 
Sixes 8.22 0.19 Yes 
Sevens 4.43 0.173 Yes 
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 The variable for corn surprisingly showed a positive effect on Kentucky basis. 
This variable was significant at the 99% level. One explanation for this could be that as 
corn prices go up, feeder cattle futures go down more than the cash price in Kentucky. 
Under this scenario basis would strengthen for Kentucky feeder cattle. It was only a small 
effect however as a 1.00 per bushel increase in the pric  of corn resulted in a $1.63 per 
cwt. increase in the Kentucky basis on average.  
 The variable for deferred live cattle futures showed a positive effect on basis at 
the 99% level. This was an expected result, but the impact was small. For a $1.00 per 
cwt. increase in the price of the deferred live cattle futures price a $0.22 per cwt. increase 
could be expected in the basis on average. 
 The variable on ratio of heifer slaughter showed an unexpected positive 
relationship to the basis. It was significant at the 95% level, but had little economic 
impact on basis with an increase in basis $0.32 per cwt. for an increase of 1% in heifer 
slaughter on average. It is possible that this result co ld be because of the stage of the 
cattle cycle during the study period. However with less than five years worth of data it is 
not legitimate to make a statement about cattle cycle effects on this model because the 
cattle cycle is a longer term phenomenon.    
 The head count variable showed an insignificant positive relationship to basis. It 
was expected to be positive, but my hypothesis was th t it would be significant. Since 
each observation was at least 20 head the positive effect of cattle sold in groups was 
probably already captured in the data. 
 The marketings variable showed a small but significant negative relationship with 
basis. For a 1000 head increase in marketings the Kentucky basis could be expected to 
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fall by $0.09 per cwt. on average. A negative result was expected, but the impact of the 
level of marketings was expected to have a larger impact on basis. It is possible that some 
of the effect of marketings was captured by the dummy variables for month. 
 The variable for the beef demand index had an insignificant positive relationship 
on Kentucky basis. One explanation for this is thatbeef demand is determined at the 
consumer level for beef. When that effect trickles back the marketing chain to feeder 
cattle prices it seems plausible that it may not have a significant effect on basis levels. 
 The variable for black hided cattle had a small but significant positive relationship 
on basis. The basis was expected to be $0.37 per cwt. higher if the cattle were black hided 
on average. The variable was significant at the 99%level. It was expected that black 
hided cattle would show a positive sign because they ar  viewed by feedlots as a 
premium grade of feeder cattle relative to other breds and may be eligible for the 
Certified Angus beef program (Eldridge).  
 The variable on Holsteins had a large negative relationship to basis. If a feeder 
calf was classified as a Holstein the basis was on average $17.51 per hundredweight 
weaker. This variable was significant at the 99% level. This sign was expected for 
Holstein cattle.  
 The variable on steer was a large positive relationship to basis. It was significant 
at the 99% level. If a feeder calf is a steer on aver ge the basis is expected to be $8.01 per 
cwt. higher. The sign and magnitude were expected for the steer dummy variable. 
 The variables for month showed positive values for January through August then 
negative values for September and October and then positive again for December. All of 
these variables were relative to November as that was the base month. With the exception 
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of September all of these variables were significant at the 99% level. If a feeder calf was 
sold in January the basis was $3.49 per cwt. higher than in November on average. If a 
feeder calf was sold in February the basis was $5.24 per cwt. higher than in November on 
average. If a feeder calf was sold in March the basis was on average $6.37 per cwt. higher 
relative to November. If a calf was sold in April the basis was on average $7.27 higher 
relative to November. If a feeder calf was sold in May the basis was on average $5.95 
higher relative to November. If a feeder calf was sold in June the basis was on average 
$3.02 per cwt. higher than in November. If a feeder calf was sold in July the basis was on 
average $3.38 higher than in November. If a feeder calf was sold in August the basis was 
on average $1.75 higher than in November. If a feeder calf was sold in September the 
basis was on average $0.14 lower than in November. If a feeder calf was sold in October 
the basis was on average $1.49 lower than in November. If a feeder calf was sold in 
December the basis was on average $2.98 higher than in November. These results were 
expected except for the December time period. December is a shorter marketing month 
than the other months because of the Christmas holiday. Typically it has lighter 
marketings than the fall months, although the last s le of the year can bring large 
numbers of cattle as farmers sell cattle to be included on that tax year. The positive sign 
is most likely a result of the heavy fall supply is already gone by December. In general 
these variables follow the general seasonal trend based on supply and demand for feeders. 
The dummy variables for markets showed expected results. All were significant 
except for the variables for Owenton and Paris. All of the markets are relative to the 
Bluegrass market as that was the base. The Ky.-Tenn. market showed its in-weigh status 
with a negative parameter. If a feeder calf sold at the Ky.-Tenn. market on average it 
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brought $3.08 per cwt. less than the Bluegrass market. If a feeder calf sold at the Paris 
market the basis was on average $0.09 higher than the Bluegrass market. If a feeder calf 
sold at the Owenton market it brought on average $0.09 less than the Bluegrass market. If 
a feeder calf sold at a CPH sale at the Bluegrass or Paris location it brought on average 
$3.79 more than the Bluegrass sale. These results were expected of these markets. It 
makes sense that there would be no significant difference in prices between the 
Bluegrass, Paris, and Owenton markets because they are in close proximity to one 
another.  
 The dummy variables for weight were all significant t the 99% level. All of the 
weight variables are compared to the eight hundred pound class and up of feeder cattle as 
that is the base. If a calf was between two and four hundred pounds the basis was on 
average $26.44 per cwt. higher than an eight weight feeder calf. If a feeder calf weighed 
between four and five hundred pounds the basis was on average $18.24 per cwt. higher 
than for eight weight feeder cattle. If a feeder calf weighed between five and six hundred 
pounds the basis was on average $12.88 per cwt. higher than for eight weight feeder 
cattle. If a feeder calf weighed between six and seven hundred pounds the basis was on 
average $8.22 higher than for an eight weight feeder calf. If a feeder calf weighed 
between seven and eight hundred pounds the basis wa on verage $4.43 higher than the 
basis for an eight weight feeder calf. These results were expected as the feeder cattle 
futures contract specifications are for 650 to 850 pound feeder cattle. The lighter feeder 
cattle prices are higher relative to the futures price and as the weight approaches the 
contract spec weight the price more closely reflects the futures price.  
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Out of Sample Testing With the Basis Model 
 For the basis model to be beneficial for producers to use as a forecasting tool it 
must do an acceptable job forecasting with out of sample data. The model was tested with 
out of sample data from Bluegrass Stockyards for seven and eight weight feeder steers. 
Individual load lots of cattle were chosen from Janu ry through the first week of June 
2006. After using the model to forecast basis, those re ults were compared to basis table 
predictions of basis to see which did a better job of forecasting the actual basis. A Theil’s 
inequality coefficient was used to determine whether  model did a good job of 
predicting basis. It is a ratio with root mean squared error in the numerator and the 
denominator is scaled such that the ratio is always between zero and one (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld). A ratio closer to zero indicates there is not much difference between the 
predicted and actual values for basis and thus the model has good predictive power. A 
ratio closer to one indicates there is considerable diff rence between the actual and 
predicted values thus the model does not have good predictive power.  
The Theil’s coefficient for seven weight cattle was .74 indicating the model did 
not do a good job forecasting out of sample basis. The Theil’s coefficient for eight weight 
cattle was .51 which was somewhat better than for seven weight cattle, but still indicated 
the model did not do a good job forecasting out of sample data. Apparently basis tables 
are still the best forecasting tools that a producer can use to arrive at an expected basis.        
Hedge Ratio model and results  
Cross hedging cattle of different weights and sex with feeder cattle futures can 
present a challenge for the producer. Myers and Thomps n define a hedge ratio as the 
proportion of cash positions that should be covered by opposite positions in futures 
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contracts. The following example presents the definition of a hedge ratio as it applies to 
feeder cattle hedging. Light weight calves and stocker attle prices are more volatile than 
feeder cattle that meet contract specifications and heavier weight feeder cattle prices tend 
to be less volatile than feeder cattle that meet con ract specifications (Elam). The result is 
that more than one futures contract is needed to offset the price movements of 50,000 
pounds of light weight stocker cattle in the cash market. On the other hand, for heavier 
feeder cattle it follows that less than one futures contract would be needed to offset the 
price movements for 50,000 pounds in the cash market.  
 Hedge ratios have been used when the certain class and weight of cattle don’t 
match the contract specifications. Elam and Davis did a study and found that hedging risk 
could be reduced by applying a hedge ratio. An optimal hedge ratio minimizes the ratio 
of the covariance between cash and futures price to the variance of futures price for 
expected price movement (Stoll and Whaley). This ratio has been estimated with OLS 
regression in past studies. Elam and Davis simply regressed futures prices on cash prices 
over time to arrive at estimated hedge ratios. Myers and Thompson suggest that using 
price levels is too restrictive to get accurate estimates. Simple regression is also not the 
correct theoretical approach to optimal hedge ratio estimation according to Myers and 
Thompson. Simple OLS regression estimates a ratio of he unconditional covariance 
between futures price changes and cash price changes to the unconditional variance of 
futures prices (Myers and Thompson). This property makes simple regression unsuitable 
for estimating hedge ratios according to Myers and Thompson. The correct theoretical 
method for the optimal hedge ratio is a ratio of conditional covariance between cash and 
futures price levels to the conditional variance of futures price levels according to Myers 
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and Thompson. Only in special cases is a simple OLSmodel suitable for determining an 
accurate optimal hedge ratio. Using simple OLS requir s the assumption that cash and 
futures price changes follow a random walk with no obvious pattern (Myers and 
Thompson). Given the scope of this research it was determined that OLS regressions 
using price changes would be appropriate for estimating optimal hedge ratios for data 
from the Bluegrass market. The OLS model used is asfollows:  
∆Casht = β0 + β1∆futures + εt, where ∆Casht is the change in cash price, β0 is an intercept, 
β1∆futures is the change in futures prices, and εt is an error term.   
The following tables contain estimated hedge ratios for non contract weight 
feeder steers and heifers sold at Bluegrass Stockyards. The hedge ratios for the spring 
months were a little higher than those for the fall months. The ratios on average were all 
close to one for steers and heifers with the exception of the four weight heifers with a 
ratio of 1.24. November is generally a light marketing month because of the 
Thanksgiving holiday and this could be part of the reason why the estimates are so much 
smaller than the rest. It could be possible that cash prices are less volatile in this time 
period as a result of the lower marketings. 
Table 4.10 Estimated Hedge Ratios for Non-Contract Weight Stocker and Feeder 
Steers 
  
4 
weights  Adj. R2 
5 
weights Adj. R2 
6 
weights Adj. R2 
8+ 
weights Adj. R2 
January 0.872 68.90% 0.755 49.20% 0.872 50.50% 1.294 77.20% 
March 1.251 39.15% 1.845 54.90% 1.057 50.18% 1.200 68.50% 
April N/A N/A 1.223 75.80% 1.137 63.60% 1.136 83.40% 
May 0.843 46.04% 0.950 71.70% 1.100 40.80% 0.998 77.90% 
August N/A N/A 1.100 83.60% 0.998 84.70% 1.127 87.00% 
September N/A N/A 1.222 93.10% 1.074 97.40% 1.056 92.50% 
October 1.042 87.20% 0.944 81.10% 0.987 75.00% 1.030 90.30% 
November N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.135 56.00% 1.239 76.80% 
Average 1.002   1.039   1.045   1.135   
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Table 4.11 Estimated Hedge Ratios for Non-Contract Weight Stocker and Feeder 
Heifers 
  
4 
weights Adj. R2 
5 
weights Adj. R2 
6 
weights Adj. R2 
8+ 
weights Adj. R2 
January 0.777 11.60% 0.953 77.20% 1.046 71.10% 1.512 80.40% 
March N/A N/A 0.838 16.40% 1.235 67.10% 1.261 68.80% 
April 1.724 79.40% 0.994 58.40% 0.922 76.70% 0.916 88.00% 
May 0.888 84.20% 0.722 47.90% 0.880 76.20% 1.389 59.60% 
August 1.348 88.10% 1.110 79.70% 1.003 94.40% 1.067 97.70% 
September 1.525 98.20% 1.024 89.00% 1.082 86.80% 0.815 85.50% 
October 1.205 91.30% 0.937 82.20% 0.851 71.50% 0.677 64.00% 
November 0.373 1.90% 0.713 50.50% 0.780 70.00% N/A N/A 
Average 1.243   0.911   0.975   1.091   
 
These estimated optimal hedge ratios assume hedgers are i k adverse individuals. 
This is because a risk adverse individual seeks to minimize their exposure to adverse 
price movement. Many producers do not fit in this category and unless the producer has a 
large cash position a ratio hedge may be impractical. Some hedgers may want to leave a 
portion of their cash inventory open rather than stay 100% hedged. If a producer only has 
one load of cattle, selling .75 or 1.5 feeder cattle futures contracts is not possible. In the 
tables it is important to note that the average hedge ratio over the year for both steers and 
heifers is close to one. For all but the largest producers it is feasible to assume a hedge 
ratio of one. For most backgrounders and many cow-calf producers the calves and feeder 
cattle to be sold will be at least 600 lbs. According to the Elam and Davis study a hedge 
ratio of one would be sufficient for cattle that are of feeder cattle futures contract 
specification weight. It follows that most producers could use a hedge ratio of one and 
still be protected against unexpected price declines.  
 
 
Copyright © Nathaniel J. Routt 2006 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PRACTICAL SITUATION FACING PRODUCERS AND 
HEDGING STRATEGIES 
Choosing a Commodity Broker 
The most important decision producers must make before they start hedging is the 
selection of a good futures and options broker. This step is the most crucial to having a 
successful hedging experience, but is often overlooked. Most people will simply choose a 
broker that is the closest to them or use the advice of others. Many commodity brokers 
earn their living by working on commission. The more trades they execute for their 
customers, the more income they earn. This introduces the potential for unethical 
behavior on the part of the broker. Several major st ck and bond firms have faced 
penalties from the SEC due to commission related violations and unethical trading 
behavior on the part of brokers. The CFTC has not addressed the issue of unethical 
broker behavior due to commission compensation and anyone should keep this in mind 
before choosing a broker.  
Prospective hedgers and traders alike should try to avoid “salesmen” or 
commission compensated brokers because it is hard to tell if they truly have clients’ best 
interests in mind. This is especially true for the in xperienced hedger. A broker may 
advise a trade or hedge just because they want to earn commission, not because they 
think it is a good time or price to hedge. This canresult in a bad experience for the hedger 
and lead to not hedging in the future. It is often the case that one bad experience can 
make a person shy about using futures and options to hedge. It is important for the hedger 
to get unbiased advice and have a broker that puts the clients’ interests first. 
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 It takes some research by individuals to find the best broker to suit their needs. 
There are basically two types of commodity brokers. The first is the full service firm and 
the second is the discount broker. Full service brokers generally charge higher 
commissions, but are expected to provide more personalized service and advice. This 
type of broker may be the best choice for a first tme hedger. A main decision factor 
should be the broker’s personality and knowledge of the livestock futures markets as 
many brokers are specialists in certain commodity markets. One benefit of a full service 
broker is they usually have access to research and advisory services that would cost more 
if the individual hedger or speculator were to purchase it on their own. The full service 
broker may be able to catch errors in a trader’s account faster than a discount broker, 
which is an added benefit. 
 Discount brokerage firms generally charge lower commission rates and scale the 
rate down based on the amount of volume the trader do s in a given month. For a trader 
that does a decent amount of volume the savings of a discount broker can add up quickly. 
The trade off is that discount brokers do not offer any type of market advice. Typically 
discount brokers use salaried compensation for theiemployees and this helps alleviate 
the problem of salesmen type brokers. For first time and inexperienced hedgers it is 
important to have an unbiased source or an experienced friend that can give market 
advice to make a discount brokerage a feasible choice. For experienced hedgers that do a 
substantial amount of volume, the discount broker could be the best choice.  
The cost of hedging for a producer includes commission  paid, interest on margin 
money, and the cost of time spent researching the market and making hedging decisions. 
Commission rates are a small expense when compared to other variable costs faced by 
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feeder cattle producers. It is unlikely that commission costs alone would be a major 
determining factor in choosing a broker. The following table shows a range of 
commission costs and the small cost per cwt. 
Table 5.1 Commission Costs: Cost per One Round Turn Futures Transaction and 
the Corresponding Cost per CWT. 
commission per cwt. cost 
$30 0.060 
$40 0.080 
$50 0.100 
$60 0.120 
$70 0.140 
$80 0.160 
$90 0.180 
$100 0.200 
    
Interest paid on margin money would be equal to a short term loan rate if 
borrowed funds are used. Some producers may use their own money as margin so the 
cost would be the opportunity cost of investing the money in a money market account or 
US T- bill. In addition, most brokerages will let customers use a portion of the value of 
government bonds as margin, so the margin money can earn interest. The cost of doing 
market research and making hedging decisions is equal to the opportunity cost of the 
person’s time. Time spent researching the market and attending extension meetings could 
be viewed as an educational investment for the producer that would lead to better 
management practices. 
Private research and market advice can be helpful in making hedging decisions, 
but a hedger must keep his break even and profit objectives in mind when deciding when 
to buy or sell. Quality of order fills is identical for both discount and full service brokers. 
In the case of cattle and feeder cattle the order fill s in the pit fill orders for discount and 
full service brokers alike and no advantage is gained by paying a higher commission. For 
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smaller farmers, it is possible to open a joint account with one or two other farmers in 
order to split up hedges and initial margins. Especially for Kentucky producers this could 
be a good way to hedge. In larger grain farming regions of the country, groups of farmers 
have formed marketing clubs to help each other form marketing plans each year and help 
each other make hedging decisions. The same thing may be beneficial to Kentucky feeder 
cattle producers who want to get started hedging, but who are afraid to do it all alone. 
They could share ideas and hedging strategies for the upcoming year and hopefully make 
better marketing decisions for their cattle.       
Spread Trading Using Live Cattle Futures 
Based on the empirical evidence short hedging reduces the variability of average 
prices received by the producer. However, given the variability of actual basis faced by 
individuals, it was difficult to predict basis withn an acceptable range to make short 
hedging an efficient strategy. The use of options strategies and possibly spreads are two 
techniques that could be more beneficial for Kentucky producers. Some of the benefits 
are low margins, limited risk exposure and reliable historical patterns. 
A spread is when one contract month is bought and another month is sold. There 
are two basic spread types known as bull spreads and bear spreads. A bull spread is when 
a trader buys the near month contract and sells a further out month. In theory it should 
work when prices rise because price friendly information should be reflected to a larger 
degree in the near month relative to further out months. Thus, the long position in the 
near month should make more than the short position loses in the further out month. Bear 
spreads are just the opposite such that a trader sells th  near month and buys a further out 
month. Bear spreads should work in periods of falling prices because unfriendly price 
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information should be reflected in the near month relative to more distant months. The 
short position in the near month should make more than he long position in the further 
out month. These spreads offer the investor some prot ction from large moves in one 
direction, but the potential reward is smaller with spreads as the investor is just trying to 
capture the widening or narrowing of the difference between two prices.  
In general, bull spreads work during times of rising prices and bear spreads work 
during times of falling prices, but exceptions do occur frequently. A few factors can 
create opportunities in spreads and lower the perceived risk to the investor. Seasonality is 
a strong factor in the commodities markets. Due to the nature of production in the 
livestock industry, long term patterns have evolved that show supply to be higher at 
certain times of the year and lower at others. Some examples are weather, calving cycles 
in cattle, and certain export tariffs. Seasonality also occurs on the demand side with 
factors such as grilling season, various holidays and seasonal budget constraints. Looking 
at a spread over ten to fifteen years, it tends to be widest or narrowest at certain times of a 
given year partly based on seasonality. 
Commodity Fund Involvement in Livestock Futures  
Commodity fund involvement in cattle and hog markets has also caused the 
spread relationships to widen or narrow with a reliable frequency in recent years. The 
amount of money devoted to commodity investment has increased drastically in recent 
years as investors wish to capture the diversificaton and inflation protection qualities that 
commodities offer in a portfolio of assets. The first and smaller type of commodity fund 
is known in the futures industry as a short term fund or trading fund. These funds actively 
trade the market from the long, short and spread side at times trying to capture price 
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increases and declines and changes in the spread between months (Brooks). They are not 
trying to hedge anything, but play the role of speculators in the market. Although trading 
funds contribute a significant amount of liquidity to commodity markets, inflation fears 
and diversification have driven the majority of thecapital inflows into commodity 
markets in recent years. Also, institutional investor  have viewed commodities as having 
a chance of better returns than the stock market in recent years.  
The second and largest type of fund is the long only r index commodity fund. 
Commodity prices can be expected to rise at the rate of inflation in the long term, so these 
funds attempt to capture the long term inflationary gains in commodity prices. These 
funds hedge inflation sensitive assets such as equiti s by maintaining a long position in 
the nearby month of a set of commodities (Brooks). This makes it more difficult to 
categorize commodity funds based on CFTC data becaus  some are listed as large 
commercial traders rather than speculators. This type of fund will generally weight its 
holdings over a variety of commodities in order to capture a general picture of 
commodity prices. The funds will monitor the liquidity in a given commodity market and 
the prospect for inflation based on analysis of each individual market in order to 
determine how much to invest. This money has mainly moved into the market through 
managed money, creating the term “commodity index funds”.  
The most prominent is the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, but similar smaller 
funds exist. The Goldman Sachs Commodity Index is weighted over several 
commodities. The weight breakdown of the index as of 2004 is as follows: energy 
represents the largest part of the index at 73.58% followed by non-livestock agricultural 
at 11.48%, industrial metals 8.07%, livestock 4.68% and precious metals 2.18% (GS 
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website). The weighting of the index is of importance to Goldman Sachs. When emerging 
markets dominate world economic growth the energy and agricultural sectors tend to be 
the most responsive according to Goldman Sachs. On the other hand, when industrial 
nations drive world economic growth the agricultural sector tends to be the least 
responsive. It is evident from the index weightings that Goldman Sachs thinks world 
economic growth is driven to a large extent by developing or emerging nations. This 
currently is a widely held view among economists and investment professionals. Strong 
economic growth rates in the Chinese and Indian ecoomies have been cited as major 
contributors to increases in commodity prices worldwide. The recent run up in energy 
prices has caused Goldman Sachs to allocate excess en rgy profits to the other 
commodities in order to keep the weightings at the stated values. This is one factor that 
has driven the large increases in the open interest of livestock futures (Brooks). Large 
commercial traders have used some of this increased int rest in buying livestock futures 
to hedge cattle. The rest of the buying is largely countered by spreading from speculators 
rather than outright selling against index money like Goldman Sachs (Brooks). This has 
caused open interest to increase even more as a spre d involves at least two positions.       
All commodity funds must manage their large positions to avoid physical delivery 
of the product and comply with rules of the respectiv  exchange concerning the size of 
positions as expiry for a particular trading month ears. In general, these large positions 
must be transferred or “rolled” to the next available trading month to avoid physical 
delivery and comply with position size limits in the month of expiry. Goldman Sachs has 
a set “roll” period of the 5th to the 9th business day of the month before expiry month is 
reached for the contract. For example if Goldman Sachs is long in the June contract they 
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will roll these positions forward to the August contract during the 5th through the 9th of 
May. This transfer of one month for another generally t kes longer than the stated five 
day roll period as funds other than Goldman Sachs move positions before and after the 
stated period. The roll involves two individual trades and is most intense during the 
closing range of the day during the official roll period. On the floor, traders facilitating 
the roll sell the nearby month to offset the current lo g position. At the same time other 
traders will buy the next further out month to establish the new long position for the fund 
and thus a long position is maintained in the market. This large activity near the close can 
cause a distortion between the first two months by moving the spread to a large degree. 
This is an example of why commodity funds have been described as “giant elephants” by 
some traders. Their movements can create opportunities for the disciplined trader 
according to several market participants.  
The Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period is the main focus of these 
spreads because it occurs during a set five day period and provides plenty of liquidity to 
take new trades and liquidate existing positions. Basically a trader will establish a bear 
spread position ahead of the roll, ideally during the previous roll to capture the spread 
distortion caused by the movement of thousands of long positions from the near month to 
the next month. These positions will be liquidated against the roll or earlier if a trader’s 
profit objective is reached. The trader will then look to establish bull spreads by buying 
the first month and selling the second month against the roll or in the weeks after the 
official Goldman Sachs roll when smaller commodity index funds will be moving 
positions. The bull spread intends to capture a gain as the spread corrects after the roll 
and as the spot month liquidates late in the contract’s life. The bull spreads may be 
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liquidated before first notice day if a set profit goal is met or basis levels favor deliveries. 
The trader may also decide to sell the second month and buy the third month in 
preparation for an arbitrage of the next roll. The trader would then have a bull spread and 
bear spread at the same time. The trader would be long one contract in the first month, 
short two contracts in the second month and long one contract in the third month. This is 
also known as a butterfly spread. The roll is most pronounced in live cattle futures and 
this is why the spread technique focuses on the use of live cattle futures rather than feeder 
cattle futures. 
Fundamental factors will move the spreads in addition o the commodity fund 
activity. Sometimes it may be more risky to place a bull spread because of weak 
fundamental factors even though the roll is taking place and liquidation of the spot month 
will occur in the following month. The same is true for the bear spreads. The trader will 
look to establish positions only when the commodity fund activity and the market 
fundamentals point towards the same spread movement. The trader may choose only to 
trade the bull spread side of the roll when the fundamental outlook is for price strength 
and may choose only to trade the bear spread side of th  roll when the outlook is for price 
weakness. The individual will have to decide when to forgo a spread due to disagreement 
between the fundamental outlook and the commodity fund activity. 
Spread Trading Simulations 
Trading simulations were run over the last five years to analyze how this trading 
strategy performed. The simulations were not modifie  to account for any changes in the 
fundamental outlook for cattle prices. A program of using the Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index Fund roll period to enter all spreads nd exit the bear spreads was used 
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throughout the simulations. The bull spreads were liquidated on or close to the fifteenth 
of the delivery month for every simulation. The charts and results of the simulations are 
presented below.    
Figure 5.1 Six Year Average February – April Live Cattle Spread 
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The first set of trading simulation involves selling February and buying April on a 
spread during the November Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period. It occurs 
from the fifth through the ninth business day of November. The third day of the roll was 
used to enter trades in the simulations. Notice the five year average spread pattern tends 
to top in November and then work lower into January. The short February/long April 
attempts to capture this seasonal movement in the spread. This spread is liquidated on the 
third day of the January Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period. The next 
simulation involves buying February and selling April on a spread also on the third day 
of the January roll period. Notice how the five year average spread gains into February. 
The long February/short April attempts to capture this gain. This trade will be liquidated 
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on February 15 for the simulation. The trading simulation was carried out for the period 
2001 through 2006 and the results in cwt. are present d below.  
Table 5.2 February - April Spread Trade Simulation Results 
Long April/Short February bear spread   Long February/short April bull spread 
Year 
Enter 
11/9 
Exit 
1/9 Profit/(Loss)  
Enter 
1/9 Exit 2/15 Profit/(Loss) 
2001 -0.775 -1.700 0.925   -1.700 2.075 3.775 
2002 -2.100 -3.000 0.900   -3.000 -1.925 1.075 
2003 1.125 0.875 0.250   0.875 2.825 1.950 
2004 7.575 1.850 5.725   1.850 3.025 1.175 
2005 2.500 2.000 0.500   2.000 3.275 1.275 
2006 2.875 1.600 1.275   1.600 2.375 0.775 
average 1.867 0.271 1.596   0.271 1.942 1.671 
    
The second set of simulations involves selling April and buying June on a spread 
during the January Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period. It occurs from the fifth 
through the ninth business day of January. The third day of the roll was used to enter 
trades in the simulations. Unlike the Feb/April spread, the April/June does not show any 
large seasonal pattern other than a slight uptrend over the life of the spread. However, for 
consistency the same trading simulations are used throughout this strategy.  
Figure 5.2 Six Year Average April – June Live Cattle Spread 
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This spread is liquidated on the third day of the March Goldman Sachs 
Commodity Index roll period. The next simulation involves buying April and selling June 
on a spread also on the third day of the March roll period. Notice how the five year 
average spread gains into April. The long April/short June attempts to capture this gain. 
This trade will be liquidated on April 15 for the simulation. The trading simulation was 
carried out for the period 2001 through 2006 and the results are presented below. All 
numbers in the table are per cwt. 
Table 5.3 April - June Spread Trade Simulation Results 
Long June/Short April bear spread   Long April/Short June bull spread 
Year 
Enter 
1/9 
Exit 
3/9 Profit/(Loss)  
Enter 
3/9 Exit 4/15 Profit/(Loss) 
2001 4.675 5.850 -1.175   5.850 5.075 -0.775 
2002 3.425 5.875 -2.450   5.875 3.075 -2.800 
2003 7.525 4.750 2.775   4.750 6.400 1.650 
2004 2.375 4.475 -2.100   4.475 5.925 1.450 
2005 6.200 3.950 2.250   3.950 5.075 1.125 
2006 7.650 4.575 3.075   4.575 6.600 2.025 
average 5.308 4.913 0.396   4.913 5.358 0.446 
 
The third set of trading simulations involves selling June and buying August on a 
spread during the March Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period. It occurs from the 
fifth through the ninth business day of March. The t ird day of the roll was used to enter 
trades in the simulations. Unlike the April/June spread, the June/August does show a 
large seasonal pattern for a peak in early March. The five year average chart for the June 
– August is presented on the next page. 
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Figure 5.3 Five Year Average June – August Live Cattle Spread 
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 The short June/long August attempts to capture this movement. This spread is 
liquidated on the third day of the May Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period. The 
next simulation involves buying June and selling August on a spread also on the third day 
of the May roll period. Notice how the five year average spread gains into June. The long 
April/short June attempts to capture this gain. This trade will be liquidated on June 15 for 
the simulation. The trading simulation was carried out for the period 2001 through 2005 
and the results are presented below. All numbers in the table are per cwt. 
Table 5.4 June - August Spread Trade Simulation Results 
Long August/Short June bear spread  Long June/Short August bull spread 
Year 
Enter 
3/9 
Exit 
5/9 Profit/(Loss)  
Enter 
5/9 Exit 6/15 Profit/(Loss) 
2001 0.925 -0.300 1.225   -0.300 -0.100 0.200 
2002 0.725 -0.875 1.600   -0.875 0.200 1.075 
2003 2.725 4.450 -1.725   4.450 5.300 0.850 
2004 1.400 -1.650 3.050   -1.650 -0.400 1.250 
2005 3.775 -0.750 4.525   -0.750 1.700 2.450 
average 1.910 0.175 1.735   0.175 1.340 1.165 
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The fourth set of trading simulations involves selling August and buying October 
on a spread during the May Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period. It occurs from 
the fifth through the ninth business day of May. The t ird day of the roll was used to 
enter trades in the simulations. This spread does show a large seasonal pattern for a peak 
in early May followed by a drop into early July. 
Figure 5.4 Five Year Average August – October Live Cattle Spread 
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 The short August/long October attempts to capture this movement. This spread is 
liquidated on the third day of the July Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period. The 
next simulation involves buying August and selling October on a spread also on the third 
day of the July roll period. Notice how the five year average spread gains into August. 
The long August/short October attempts to capture this gain. This trade will be liquidated 
on August 15 for the simulation. The trading simulation was carried out for the period 
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2001 through 2005 and the results are presented below. All numbers in the table are per 
cwt. 
Table 5.5 August - October Spread Trade Simulation Results 
Long October/Short Aug bear spread   Long Aug/Short October bull spread 
Year 
Enter 
5/9 
Exit 
7/10 Profit/(Loss)  
Enter 
7/10 
Exit 
8/15 Profit/(Loss) 
2001 -1.725 -1.800 0.075   -1.800 -2.825 -1.025 
2002 -3.125 -2.650 -0.475   -2.650 -2.800 -0.150 
2003 -1.225 -1.300 0.075   -1.300 0.075 1.375 
2004 1.975 -3.700 5.675   -3.700 -2.025 1.675 
2005 -0.475 -3.800 3.325   -3.800 -1.075 2.725 
average -0.915 -2.650 1.735   -2.650 -1.730 0.920 
 
The fifth set of trading simulations involves selling October and buying 
December on a spread during the July Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll period. It 
occurs from the fifth through the ninth business day of July. The third day of the roll was 
used to enter trades in the simulations. This spread does show a seasonal pattern for a 
peak in July through August followed by a drop into September.  
Figure 5.5 Five Year October – December Live Cattle Spread 
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The short October/long December attempts to capture this movement. This spread 
is liquidated on the third day of the September Goldman Sachs Commodity Index roll 
period. The next simulation involves buying October and selling December on a spread 
also on the third day of the September roll period. Notice how the five year average 
spread gains into October. The long October/short December attempts to capture this 
gain. This trade will be liquidated on October 15 for the simulation. The trading 
simulation was carried out for the period 2001 through 2005 and the results are presented 
below. All numbers in the table are per cwt. 
Table 5.6 October - December Spread Trade Simulation Results 
Long Dec/Short October bear spread    Long October/Short Dec bull spread 
Year 
Enter 
7/10 
Exit 
9/11 Profit/(Loss)  
Enter 
9/11 
Exit 
10/15 Profit/(Loss) 
2001 -0.075 -1.975 1.900   -1.975 -0.225 1.750 
2002 -0.975 -2.275 1.300   -2.275 -2.700 -0.425 
2003 -0.725 2.725 -3.450   2.725 9.275 6.550 
2004 -0.125 -3.075 2.950   -3.075 -1.850 1.225 
2005 -2.325 -2.675 0.350   -2.675 -0.600 2.075 
average -0.845 -1.455 0.610   -1.455 0.780 2.235 
 
The sixth trading simulation involves selling December and buying February on a 
spread during the September Goldman Sachs Commodity In ex roll period. It occurs 
from the fifth through the ninth business day of September. The third day of the roll was 
used to enter trades in the simulations. This spread shows more volatility than the other 
spread charts, but a drop into late November is noted. 
 62 
Figure 5.6 Five Year Average December – February Live Cattle Spread 
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The short December/long February attempts to capture this movement. This 
spread is liquidated on the third day of the Novembr Goldman Sachs Commodity Index 
roll period. The next simulation involves buying December and selling February on a 
spread also on the third day of the November roll period. Notice how the five year 
average spread gains into December. The long December/short February attempts to 
capture this gain. This trade will be liquidated on December 15 for the simulation. The 
trading simulation was carried out for the period 2001 through 2005 and the results are 
presented below. All numbers in the table are per cwt.  
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Table 5.7 December - February Spread Trade Simulation Results 
Long Feb/Short December bear spread   Long December/Short Feb bull spread 
Year 
Enter 
9/11 
Exit 
11/11 Profit/(Loss)  
Enter 
11/11 
Exit 
12/17 Profit/(Loss) 
2001 -1.450 -3.400 1.950   -3.400 -4.600 -1.200 
2002 -1.075 -1.700 0.625   -1.700 -4.300 -2.600 
2003 0.150 4.800 -4.650   4.800 4.200 -0.600 
2004 -0.775 -1.475 0.700   -1.475 -1.575 -0.100 
2005 -1.350 -3.000 1.650   -3.000 -1.550 1.450 
average -0.900 -0.955 0.055   -0.955 -1.565 -0.610 
 
These six sets of spread trades were profitable over the past five year period. They 
can be broken down into bull spreads and bear spreads. The table below shows the 
average profit for both the bear spreads and bull spreads for the five year study period. 
Table 5.8 Five Year Avg. Combined Results for All Spreads 
                  
Entry Exit Bear spreads   Entry Exit Bull spreads 
Nov. 9th Jan. 9th April/Feb 1.596   Jan. 9th Feb. 15th Feb/April 1.671 
Jan. 9th Mar. 9th June/April 0.396   Mar. 9th April 15th April/June 0.446 
Mar. 9th May 9th Aug/June 1.735   May 9th June15th June/Aug 1.165 
May 9th July 10th Oct/Aug 1.735   July 10th Aug. 15th Aug/Oct 0.920 
July 10th Sep.11th Dec/Oct 0.610   Sep. 11th Oct. 15th Oct/Dec 2.235 
Sep. 11th Nov 9th Feb/Dec 0.055   Nov. 9th Dec. 15th Dec/Feb -0.610 
    average 1.021       average 0.971 
 
The average profit for the bear spreads were $ 1.021 per cwt. for the 2001-2005 
time period. The average profit for the bull spreads were $ 0.971 per cwt. for the 2001-
2005 time period. The average profit for the butterfly spread would be $1.992 per cwt. or 
the average for the bull spreads added to the average for the bear spreads. This is because 
a butterfly strategy simply uses both the bull and bear spreads.  
 For hedgers trying to protect against price declins, using butterfly spreads would 
have increased the average net price received, but would have increased the variability of 
those prices substantially. This result indicates that cattle spreads are not a hedging 
strategy, but rather a speculative investment. Prices were more variable when spreads 
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were used than simply taking the cash price with no edge. The following table compares 
using spreads with short hedging and no hedging. Of important note is how the variance 
in price increases dramatically as each additional spread is added. 
Table 5.9 Mean-Variance Comparisons of Using No Hedge, Short Hedging, and 1-5 
Spreads for 650-849lb Steers at Bluegrass Stockyards 
Length  Cash 
Short 
hedge 
1 
spread 
2 
spreads 
3 
spreads 
4 
spreads 
5 
spreads 
8 
months 
mean 
price 89.82 84.69 92.36 96.64 100.93 105.21 109.49 
 variance 146.42 34.26 308.24 513.01 787.95 1133.04 1548.31 
         
6 
months 
mean 
price 89.82 85.23 91.99 95.89 99.79 103.69 107.6 
 variance 146.42 46.26 297.53 478.09 715.28 1009.11 1359.59 
         
5 
months 
mean 
price 89.82 85.81 91.32 94.55 97.79 101.03 104.27 
 variance 146.42 57.71 278.66 431.34 631.66 879.64 1175.27 
         
4 
months 
mean 
price 89.82 86.41 90.72 93.36 95.99 98.63 101.27 
  variance 146.42 67.4 262.86 387.88 548.72 745.35 977.79 
 
Options Strategies 
The options on both live cattle and feeder cattle have suffered a lack of liquidity 
for some time, and commodity funds are not major trade s in those products. It is a 
smaller market made up mainly of commercial traders and various speculators (Brooks). 
The liquidity is most lacking in the deferred month options market. The difference in bid 
and ask prices can be large for deferred options cotracts. Open interest is usually small 
for the strike prices offered on these contracts, most of the time less than 100 contracts 
and many times less than 50. Generally a “liquidity premium” has to be paid in order to 
get someone to take the other side of a trade in the deferred options. This is why some 
options strategies look good on paper, but in reality they can be difficult to execute. Limit 
orders are a good idea when trying to place positions n the deferred options. With the 
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lack of liquidity it may take days for the order to be filled so patience is a good quality 
when hedging in those markets.  
A put option contract gives the buyer the right to sell a futures contract at a 
specified (strike) price anytime the futures price closes at or below the specified price. 
The buyer is not obligated to go short at the strike price, but can if they choose to. A 
premium is paid by the buyer for this right to go sh rt at the specified price. The amount 
of premium is determined by three things. The firstis the difference between the strike 
price and the current futures price (Stasko). The second is the amount of time before the 
contract expires (Stasko). The third is the amount f volatility in the futures market 
(Stasko). Generally premiums get higher the further  strike price is above the futures 
price. The more time that exists until expiry, the higher the premium will be and the more 
volatile the futures market is the higher the premiu  will be. The seller collects this 
premium, but is obligated to take the long side of the futures contract if the buyer elects 
to exercise the option. The buyer can elect to sell th  put option to take profit rather than 
convert it into a futures contract. Both ways of offsetting the option are commonly used 
and generate similar hedge profits. Selling the profitable put will result in a small 
reduction in commissions paid as there will be no futures position to offset.  
If the underlying futures contract closes above the put strike price on the option 
expiry day the option can be said to expire worthless. The buyer will simply lose the 
premium paid plus commission. Calls are exactly the opposite of put options meaning 
that the buyer of a call has the right, but not obligation to go long a futures contract if the 
price closes at or above the specified strike price. Th  call seller must take the short side 
of this position, but collects a premium from the buyer just like in the case of a put 
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option. Using outright option positions to hedge cattle price is similar to using insurance 
to protect any other asset. The following table compares the cost and net price received of 
using a put option to that of using a short futures h dge. It is important to note how the 
substantial cost of the put option reduces the expected net price. 
Table 5.10 Comparison of Using a Put Option or a Short Futures Contract to Hedge 
October 700-800lb. Feeder Steers 
  futures 
$102 strike price put 
option 
Action on May 8 
sell at 
102.90 buy at $3.50 per cwt. 
   
Initial margin or 
cost $1,000.00  $1,750.00  
   
   
additional cost if 
market goes up 
$500 for 
each None 
 $1 per cwt.  
   
Expected basis -0.73 -0.73 
est. from table   
   
expected net  
futures-
basis strike-premium-basis 
cash price 
formula 
102.90-
0.73 102.00-3.50-0.73 
net cash price in 
October $102.17  $97.77  
   
The next options strategies are similar to futures spreads. They are the bull and 
bear option spreads. They are known as the bull call spread and bear put spread. The bear 
put spread is for hedgers who want protection from falling prices. It involves buying a put 
with a reasonably close to the money strike price and then selling a more out of the 
money put to offset some of the price of the more near the money put. The maximum 
profit from this hedge is the difference between the two strike prices less the net premium 
paid and commissions. This strategy leaves unlimited upside potential for the producer 
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which is an advantage. The bull call spread is for pr ducers who need upward price 
protection. It involves buying a near the money call and selling a more out of the money 
call. It is similar to the bear put spread in that the maximum expected profit is the 
difference between the strike prices less the net premium paid and commissions. The goal 
with put and call spreads is to get the largest difference in strike price for options that are 
as close to the money as possible for the least amount of net premium paid. The 
following table shows an example of a bear put spread. 
Table 5.11 Bear Put Spread Strategy for Hedging October 700-800lb. Feeder Steers 
 
$102 strike price put 
option 
$94 strike price put 
option 
Action Buy at 3.50 per cwt. sell at 1.25 per cwt. 
   
Initial margin or 
cost $1,750.00  ($625) 
net cost $1,125.00   
per cwt. $2.25 per cwt.  
Max profit formula long put-short put-net cost  
 
102-94-2.25 = $5.75 per 
cwt.  
If futures prices go 
to:   
 Futures-basis-net cost  
$110.00  110-0.73-2.25 = $107.02  
   
 Futures-basis+net hedge profit 
$94.00  94-0.73+5.75 = $99.02  
   
 Futures-basis+net hedge profit 
$90.00  90-0.73+5.75 = $95.02   
 
The next strategy would be bull and bear options fece strategies. For the cattle 
producer this would involve a bear fence comprised of buying a near the money put 
option and selling an out of the money call option. Selling the call reduces the purchase 
price of the put. It is a cheaper way to get downside protection than simply buying a put 
option. This would lock in a range of expected prices. The short call would limit the 
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upside potential in price, but the long put would provide unlimited downside protection. 
As long as the upward price ceiling is high enough, this strategy has the benefit of lower 
cost over simply buying a put for a producer. The ceiling will be determined by the call 
strike price minus the expected basis and net cost.The lower bound will be determined 
by the put strike price minus the basis and net cost. A producer looking to hedge stocker 
cattle purchases could use the bull fence by buying a ear the money call and selling an 
out of the money put option. This is a cheaper way to establish upside protection than 
simply buying a call option. It establishes a range of purchase prices rather than sale 
prices compared to the previous example. An example of a bear options fence is 
presented in the table below. It is important to note that a price ceiling and floor are 
established with this strategy. 
Table 5.12 Bear Option Fence Strategy for Hedging October 700-800lb. Feeder 
Steers 
  $102 strike price put option 
$112 strike price call 
option 
Action Buy at 3.50 per cwt. sell at 0.85 per cwt.  
    
Initial margin or cost $1,750.00  ($425)  
net cost  $1,325.00    
per cwt. 2.65 per cwt.   
price ceiling Short call-basis-net cost   
 112-0.73-2.65 = $108.62   
price floor long put-basis-net cost   
 102-0.73-2.65 = $98.62   
If futures prices go to:    
 futures-basis-net cost-loss on short call  
$115.00  115-0.73-2.65-3.00 = $108.62  
    
 futures-basis-net cost   
$112.00  112-0.73-2.65 = $108.62   
    
 futures-basis+put profit-net cost  
$90.00  90-0.73+12.00-2.65 = $98.62   
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These option strategies may be good hedging alternatives for small and large 
Kentucky producers alike. The only expense for purchasing options is the premium and 
broker commission which makes them a better choice f r individuals who do not want to 
risk margin calls with short futures positions. Usually the initial margin for short options 
positions is some proportion of the initial margin for a futures contract depending on how 
far out of the money the option is. Market volatility is also factored into the formula for 
determining initial margin for short options positions. They can be viewed as price 
insurance policies for the producer. In most cases options strategies provide less price 
protection than holding a short futures position, but they do protect against unexpected 
price movements. This definitely makes option strategies a better alternative than simply 
not hedging at all.  
The only downside to using options strategies is the premiums that they sell for 
can be a significant cost for the hedger. For example the $102.00 strike price put option 
on the October futures contract used in the examples above would cost approximately 
$28.00 per head to purchase. This assumes the producer will have 63 head of 800lb. 
feeder steers for sale sometime in October. For individuals that can tolerate more risk it 
may be possible for a producer to offset some of the premium paid for an options strategy 
by using some of the live cattle spread techniques m ntioned previously. However, this 
may not be preferable for a risk adverse individual.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Conclusions 
Using feeder cattle futures as a hedge reduced variability in prices and thus 
variability in income. To that end short hedging achieved its purpose. The other 
important aspect of hedging was whether an individual actually locked in a profit from 
hedging. It was dependent on their breakeven price, ov rall quality of cattle and the 
accuracy of their expected basis estimate. The key would have been to know a likely 
range that the actual basis would fall in and then b  able to lock in a sufficient margin 
that would account for the actual basis if it fell in the weak end of the range. The 
following tables show the high, low average, and standard deviation for basis at 
Bluegrass Stockyards. Bluegrass was chosen because it had the most data of any of the 
markets. The 600-700 and 700-800 pound weight ranges were chosen because of the 
large numbers of data and these weights are most likely to be the end product that 
Kentucky producers, order buyers and dealers will market. The steer and heifer data in 
the tables includes beef cattle only. 
Table 6.1 Five Year Average Basis for 600-700 lb. Steers at Bluegrass Stockyards 
Month High Low Average 
Std. 
Deviation 
January 12.02 -4.8 2.32 3.83 
February 10.02 -1.45 4.39 3.68 
March 15.3 -1.25 7.29 4.17 
April 18.35 0.5 8.95 4.99 
May 13.65 -0.17 6.71 3.71 
June 16.7 -5.43 6.49 6.53 
July 12.6 -0.23 5.74 4.72 
August 11.63 -10.17 2.62 5.24 
September 7.8 0.43 3.09 2.15 
October 9.47 -13.75 0.07 5.72 
November 6.38 -7.92 -0.38 3.08 
December 11.17 -6.2 1.49 3.84 
Average 12.09 -4.20 4.06 4.30 
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Table 6.2 Five Year Average Basis for 700-800 lb. Steers at Bluegrass Stockyards 
Month High Low Average 
Std. 
Deviation 
January 9.27 -4.73 0.02 2.65 
February 5.78 -6.45 -0.23 2.74 
March 7.35 -4.55 -0.28 2.16 
April 6.75 -5.3 0.87 2.84 
May 6.68 -3.77 0.34 2.49 
June 6.67 -9.98 -0.67 4.29 
July 11.55 -3.3 1.57 3.45 
August 7.65 -7.47 0.64 2.73 
September 4.1 -5.5 -1.15 2.57 
October 7.2 -7.12 -0.04 2.92 
November 8.38 -15.42 -0.73 3.76 
December 8.17 -7.5 1.45 3.67 
Average 7.46 -6.75 0.15 3.02 
 
Table 6.3 Five Year Average Basis for 600-700 lb. Heifers at Bluegrass Stockyards 
Month High Low Average 
Std. 
Deviation 
January 5.32 -11.8 -2.81 3.18 
February 5.8 -9.78 -1.79 3.53 
March 4.85 -6.73 -2.33 2.74 
April 6.45 -4.78 -0.01 2.69 
May 6.42 -8.67 -0.74 3.01 
June 3.32 -9.73 -2.41 3.48 
July 3.47 -7.17 -2.16 2.4 
August 2.8 -9.22 -2.66 2.87 
September 2.65 -7.25 -2.25 3.01 
October -0.63 -17 -6.82 5.09 
November 0.08 -16.67 -7.11 4.28 
December 3.25 -11.5 -4.09 3.32 
Average 3.65 -10.02 -2.93 3.30 
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Table 6.4 Five Year Average Basis for 700-800 lb. Heifers at Bluegrass Stockyards 
Month High Low Average 
Std. 
Deviation 
January -1.6 -10.8 -5.78 2.04 
February 2.12 -12 -5.69 3.7 
March -0.75 -7.23 -4.73 1.78 
April 3.1 -9.78 -4.58 2.64 
May -2.07 -9.37 -5.09 1.63 
June 0.02 -14.93 -4.72 3.46 
July -0.52 -9.82 -4.53 2.35 
August -0.3 -11.22 -5.52 2.46 
September -0.5 -8.15 -5.45 2.65 
October -3.42 -11.42 -8.26 2.1 
November 2.27 -10.02 -6.75 3.11 
December 3.15 -8.03 -1.86 4.05 
Average 0.13 -10.23 -5.25 2.66 
 
Of important notice is the range of basis in all of these tables. There is a 
substantial difference between the high or stronger than average basis and the low or 
weaker than average basis. For example the 95% confidence interval for April 700-800lb. 
feeder heifers is [.59 per cwt. to -9.75 per cwt.]. This means that 95% of the time the 
actual basis will be from .59 per cwt. over April futures to 9.75 per cwt under April 
futures in the month of April. This is an obstacle to using naive short hedges because the 
95% confidence interval of expected basis is so wide. Basis variability is less than price 
variability but both are substantial, which demonstrates the risk faced by producers, 
backgrounders, and order buyers. Hedgers would have to b  offered large profit margins 
in order to feel confident they could actually overcome basis risk and net a profit at the 
end of the hedge period. At times the market may offer substantial profit opportunities 
that a potential hedger can capture. Another strategy may be preferable in this case.   
Options strategies may be the best alternative for most producers. Even when the 
producer has less than a full load of cattle, it may be justifiable to use a put option or an 
option spread strategy. The reason is that while it may not be possible to lock in a profit, 
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protection against an unexpected decline in prices can be achieved. This price risk 
reduction makes using options strategies an efficient choice for producers and dealers.  
Producers and order buyers must keep in mind the mean-variance tradeoff when 
choosing a hedging strategy. For example the coeffici nt of variation can be used to 
compare the relative variability between strategies. It i  simply the standard deviation 
divided by the mean expressed as a percentage. It is a measure of dispersion around the 
respective sample mean. The coefficient of variation for no hedge at Bluegrass 
Stockyards was 13.47% compared to a six month naive hedge of 7.97% and a six month 
three spread strategy at 26.79%. Hedging did reduce pri  variability while spreads 
increased price variability relative to simply taking the cash price.     
Implications 
 The model used to describe Kentucky basis was unable to give an accurate 
estimate that could be used as an expected basis in forming a cash price forecast. Future 
work in this area should focus on developing a more accurate forecast of basis three to six 
months in the future. Modeling price risk from producers and backgrounders decision 
making framework is another potential area for furthe  work. It is likely the case that 
visible factors such as the various breeds of cattle nd the condition of the cattle when 
they are marketed have a large impact on basis levels. If a more accurate forecast of basis 
could be obtained it should increase the use of feeder cattle futures and options contracts 
as hedging strategies. Kentucky cattle producers, back-grounders and dealers would 
certainly benefit as a result. 
 Livestock insurance is another price risk management strategy that is available in 
some Midwestern states that someday may be applicable to Kentucky producers. It is 
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basically a put option on the cash feeder cattle ind x. The insurance policies may be 
cheaper than a comparable put option on feeder cattle fu ures because of a 13% subsidy. 
One major benefit of these policies is that producers an buy a policy that matches the 
size of their herd (Barnaby). This makes insurance a more cost effective strategy for 
smaller producers as compared to simply using CME feeder cattle put options. Given that 
Kentucky has a large number of small producers, livestock insurance could turn out to be 
a viable risk management strategy.  
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